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ABSTRACT
SUBSTANCE AND ATTRIBUTES IN SPINOZA'S PHILOSOPHY
(May 197?)
Linda Trompetter, B.A., Pennsylvania State University
M.T.S., Harvard University
M.A., University of Massachusetts
Ph.D., University of Massachusetts
Directed by: Professor Ann. Ferguson
This dissertation is an analysis of Spinoza's claim
that there is only one substance (proposition XIV, Ethics ) .
The various problems arising from, and interpretations of,
that claim are examined. These issues concern the arguments
themselves: their conclusions, whether the conclusions
prove what Spinoza thinks they prove, and perhaps most
importantly, certain key concepts of Spinoza ("attribute",
"substance", and "essence") embedded in the premises of
the arguments
.
By careful examination it is found that most of
Spinoza's arguments for the claim that there is only one
substance in the universe are either problematic or de-
fective . The main obstacle to Spinoza's claim is not
what is commonly thought, that is, the De Vries problem,
"but rather the arguments themselves. All the arguments
examined are found to include very problematic premises.
Spinoza is unable to satisfactorily prove either that,
1) one substance cannot be produced by another substanc
or 2) that there cannot be two self-caused infinite sub
stances. Since both of these claims are necessary to
establish proposition XIV, he is unable to support it.
VI
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PREFACE
"How is it possible," thought the emperor, "that
what they see so clearly I cannot see at all? Are they
wise men? Am I a fool?"'*"
Although flagrant disagreement exists among commenta-
tors concerning Spinoza's views on substance and attributes,
all proclaim that given Spinoza's definitions and axioms,
the derivation of his central tenet (that there is exact-
ly one substance), is as obvious as the emperor's famous
new clothes. My vision is not so clear.
In the secondary literature on Spinoza there is, as
far as I have discovered, very little critical discussion
of Spinoza's claim that there is only one substance in the
universe . We are informed that he held the view that there
is only one substance, but never fully presented with an
analysis of Spinoza's arguments for this thesis, or any
critical evaluation of the arguments- Consequently, when
commentators tell us that Spinoza believed there is but
one substance in the university, it is not at all clear what
is being ascribed to Spinoza, nor what the premises are
which led Spinoza to such a conclusion.
Y~. Hans C. Anderson, "The Emperor's New Clothes," from
Fairy Tales
,
trans . E. V. Lucas (New York: Grosset
& Dunlap, 1967), 239 *
Vlll
The present study is an attempt to present a coherent
analysis of Spinoza's claim that there is only one substance.
Unlike other commentators, I critically examine various pro-
blems arising from, and interpretations of, that claim.
Specifically, this study examines various issues that arise
from an examination of three arguments Spinoza employs in
support of this claim. These issues concern the arguments
themselves: their conclusions, whether the conclusions
prove what he thinks they prove
,
and perhaps most impor-
tantly, certain key concepts of Spinoza ("attribute",
"substance", and "essence") embedded in the premises of
the arguments
.
In Chapter I, a discussion and brief exploration of the
problems in three arguments for the conclusion that there
is only one substance is presented.
Spinoza’s definition of "attribute", and a considera-
tion of various interpretations and problems with that defi-
nition, is presented in Chapters II and III.
In Chapter II, I examine whether Spinoza thinks of
the attributes as "subjective" (having no reality outside
the perceiving intellect), or whether he thinks of them as
"objective" (having a reality outside the perceiving in-
tellect). A consideration of, and arguments against, the
views of two Spinoza scholars (H. A. Wolfson and G. H. R.
Parkinson) is given here. I conclude Chapter II by offering
IX
my own reasons for the "objectivist" position. (Later I
show that Spinoza can consistently claim both that the
attributes have a reality outside the perceiving intellect
and that there is only one substance
.
)
Spinoza's notion of "essence" is discussed in Chap-
ter III. First, I define what an essence is for Spinoza,
and then attempt to discover whether Spinoza's "essence"
resembles what is commonly meant by that term. Employing
a distinction by A. Plantinga, I ask whether an essence
is, for Spinoza, something that "uniquely individuates"
whatever has it, or whether it is simply what is called
an essential property. Three conflicting statements by
Spinoza on this issue are given, and three possible solu-
tions to this apparent inconsistency are offered. I then
show that the adoption of the third solution is preferable
to either of the others since it allows Spinoza to hold
that there is only one substance , and that substance has
an infinite number of attributes
.
In Chapter IV, I consider Spinoza's definition of
"substance", focusing on interpretations of, and problems
relating to, that definition. I ask if Spinoza holds a
substratum view of a substance. Specifically, it is
queried whether a substance is a substratum which supports
all the qualities inhering in it, or something else en-
tirely .
XIn the first part of Chapter V an important objection
to Spinoza raised by Simon De Vries concerning the apparent
inconsistency between the oneness of substance and the mul-
tiplicity of the attributes is presented. Second, I pre-
sent one of Leibniz' objections to Spinoza's definitions
of "substance” and "attribute" and consider the various
problems this objection raises for Spinoza. Third, I pre-
sent E. M. Curley's thesis about substance and its attri-
butes and show how his thesis is related to both the Leib-
niz and De Vries problems.
In the first part of Chapter VI a critique of E . M.
Curley's proposed solution to the problem raised by Leib-
niz is offered. I show that Curley's thesis about substance
and its attributes is mistaken. My own interpretation of
the problems raised by Leibniz and De Vries is then presented.
In summary, Chapter VII utilizes the discussions in
Chapters II through VI to further explore the difficulties
present in Spinoza's claim that there is only one substance.
My interpretation of the three arguments in Chapter I is
given. I also consider the truth of the premises, and whe-
ther the considerations Spinoza offers in support of his
conclusions are sufficient to support them.
1CHAPTER I
SPINOZA'S ARGUMENTS FOR ONE SUBSTANCE
Spinoza's statement of the claim that there is only
one substance in the universe comes in proposition XIY
Part I of the Ethics and reads
:
Besides God no substance can be granted
or conceived.... As God is a being ab-
solutely infinite, of whom no attribute
that expresses the essence of substance
can be denied (by Def . vi
. )
,
and he
necessarily exists (by Prop, xi
. )
;
if
any substance besides God were granted,
it would have to be explained by some
attribute of God, and thus two substances
with the same attribute would exist, which
(by Prop, v.) is absurd; therefore, besides
God no substance can be granted, or, conse-
quently, be conceived. If it could be con-
ceived, it would necessarily have to be
conceived as existent; but this (by the
first part of this proof) is absurd.
Therefore, besides God no substance can
be granted or conceived.
1
Spinoza's argument in support of proposition XIV has three
separate parts, none of which independently supports pro-
position XIV. In order to demonstrate that there is only
one substance in the universe Spinoza argues: (1) There
must be at least one substance, (2) one substance cannot
produce or cause another substance, and (3) there cannot
be two self-caused substances. Spinoza argues for claim (1)
1. B. Spinoza, Ethics , trans
.
Inc., 1955 )
»
5^-55*
R. H. Elwes (New York: Dover
2in proposition XI Part I of the Ethics where he attempts
to show that "God, or substance, consisting of infinite
attributes, of which each expresses eternal and infinite
2
essentiality, necessarily exists." I present Spinoza's
arguments for claims ( 2 ) and ( 3 ) as follows:^
(2) One substance cannot be produced by another
substance (Prop, vi
.
)
.
Hence, there cannot
be two substances: a self-caused infinite
substance which produces a created finite
substance
.
ARGUMENT A. (Reductio)
1. Suppose there are two substances
A and B, such that A causes B.
2 . Things which have nothing in common
cannot the one be the cause of the
other. (Prop. Ill)
3- A and B must have something in
common. (1,2)
4. Two substances whose attributes are
different have nothing in common.
(Prop. II)
5 . A and B must share the same attri-
bute . (3 >4
)
6. There cannot exist in the universe
two or more substances having the
same nature or attribute. (Prop. V)
7 . A and B cannot share the same
attribute. ( 6 )
2. Spinoza, Ethics , 51. I do not discuss proposition XI
in this dissertation, for the proper treatment of this
requires a separate paper
.
3 . Material for Arguments A through D from Spinoza, Ethics
,
45 ff.
38
. © 5,7
9- There cannot he two substances A
and B, such that A causes B.
ARGUMENT B. (Reductio)
1. Suppose there are two substances
A and B, such that A causes B.
2. The knowledge of an effect depends
on and involves the knowledge of
a cause. (Axiom IV)
3 • Knowledge of B depends on and
involves knowledge of A. (1,2)
4. Substance is that which is in
itself and conceived through it-
self; in otherwords, a conception
of it can be formed independently
of any other conception. (Def. Ill)
5 • B must be in itself and conceived
through itself. (1,4)
6 . If B is conceived through itself
then knowledge of B cannot depend
on knowledge of A. (Def. Ill)
7 • Knowledge of B cannot depend on
knowledge of A. (MP 5,6)
8
. © 3,7
.*. 9 . There cannot be two substances A
and B such that A causes B.
(3) There cannot be two self-caused substances
( i .e . , there cannot be two gods).
ARGUMENT C. (Reductio)
1. Suppose there are two substances, A
and B
.
42 . Every substance is necessarily
infinite. (Prop. VIII)
3- A is infinite and B is infinite.
( 1 . 2 )
4. The more reality or being a thing
has the greater the number of its
attributes. (Prop. IX)
5 • A has infinite attributes and B
has infinite attributes. (2,4
and Def. VI)
6. If A possesses infinite attributes
then A possesses all possible attri-
butes. (Def. VI and Prop. XIV
Book I, "No attribute that expresses
the essence of substance can be de-
nied.")
7. If B possesses infinite attributes
then B possesses all possible attri-
butes. (Same as above)
8. A possesses all possible attributes.
(MP 5,6)
9 . B possesses all possible attributes.
(MP 5,7)
10. A and B possess the same attribute.
(8,9)
11. There cannot exist in the universe
two or more substances having the
same nature or attribute. (Prop. V)
12. A and B cannot possess the same
attribute. (11)
13. (x) 10,12
14. There cannot be two substances,
A and B
.
5As can be seen from the above proofs, the derivation
of the oneness of substance is far from obvious. In the
remainder of this chapter I shall examine individually
certain problematic premises in arguments A and B, briefly
pointing out the problems in premises 2, 4 and 6 in argu-
ment A and premise 2 in argument B.
The primary purpose here is to show that without an
understanding of the key concepts ("attribute", "essence"
and "substance") in Spinoza, one cannot begin to compre-
hend the premises embedded in the various arguments.
Consider premise 4 (proposition II) of argument A:
"Two substances whose attributes are different have no-
thing in common." The proof for this proposition is:
Evident from def. iii . For each must
exist in itself and be conceived through
itself; in other words, the conception
of the one does not imply the concep-
tion of the other.
^
Supposedly, from Spinoza’s definition of "substance" this
proposition follows • An examination of this proposition
raises the following questions: Does the definition of
"substance" alone yield proposition II? What does Spinoza
mean by the phrase "have nothing in common"? Are the
attributes the only things that two substances could
possess in common?
TT. Spinoza. EthicsT 47 .
6It is difficult to perceive how proposition II follows
from Spinoza's definition of "substance". In order to get
the desired conclusion as it stands, Spinoza must have
some suppressed premise (s) in mind. One possible premise
is: If two substances share a similar attribute then the
conception of the one substance involves the conception
of the other (P Q) . By definition a substance cannot
involve the conception of anything else (~Q). The con-
clusion that follows from this is that two substances
cannot share a similar attribute (^P). This is the con-
clusion Spinoza reaches in proposition V, not proposition
II. Were this Spinoza's argument proposition V would
simply be a restatement of proposition II. But proposi-
tion II does not appear to state what proposition V as-
serts. Proposition II claims that if two substances have
different attributes then they have nothing in common. It
does not purport to show that two substances cannot have the
same attribute . Furthermore , it is not clear that Spinoza
would hold that sharing an attribute entails sharing the
same conception. If the above is not the suppressed pre-
mise of proposition II, it is not at all clear what that
premise might be . Nothing Spinoza offers
,
including his
definition of "substance", yields the desired conclusion.
It would help if we knew what Spinoza means by two things
having nothing in common.
7In Axiom V Spinoza gives a clue regarding what it
means to say that two things have nothing in common.
Axiom V states:
Things which have nothing in common
cannot be understood, the one by means
of the other; the conception of one
does not involve the conception of
the other.
5
Proposition II, when filled out in this way, states that
if two substances have different attributes then the con-
ception of the one substance does not involve the concep-
tion of the other substance. If we deleted the phrase,
"whose attributes are different," then proposition II is
trivially true, for it is simply a restatement of the
definition of "substance" . Proposition II as it stands
is supposed to be a statement about the nature of not
only a substance, but an attribute also. Yet, the defi-
nition of "attribute" is not referred to in the demonstra-
tion. Spinoza attempts to prove something about the attri-
butes, but uses exclusively the definition of "substance".
The phrase, "whose attributes are different," seems totally
irrelevant to this proposition. Two substances by defini-
tion have nothing in common, if by that he means the con-
ception of the one does not involve the conception of the
other. Hence, it is unclear why Spinoza adds the phrase
"whose attributes are different."
5 . Spinoza, Ethics , 46.
Perhaps the phrase "whose attributes are different"
is purely parenthetical. In a letter to Oldenburg where
8
Spinoza discusses this proposition he states:
Things which possess different attri-
butes have nothing in common. For by
attribute I have explained that I mean
something of which the conception does
not involve the conception of anything
else .6
The above quotation shows that attributes, like substances,
are things that do not have anything in common with any-
thing else . As such, the phrase "whose attributes are
different" is simply a qualifying phrase in proposition
II, which adds nothing new to the proposition.
Even if two substances have different attributes, it
still seems possible that they could share similar modifi-
cations. Spinoza states in his definitions in Book I of
the Ethics that substances possess not only attributes but
modifications.^ Why is it that two substances cannot have
modifications in common? In otherwords, why, if only
their attributes are different, do two substances have
nothing in common? Spinoza does not allow that the posses-
sion of a common mode is a sufficient condition for com-
monality between two substances. Yet he does seem to al-
low that the possession of a common attribute (a common
B. Spinoza. Correspondence , trans • R. H. M. Elwes
(New York: Dover Inc., 1955 ) » 283-
7. Spinoza, Ethics , 45-
9conception) is a sufficient condition. It is unclear why
he allows the one, yet disallows the other. If inodes are
not the kinds of things that can he shared he should give
some argument to that effect, or offer some explanation
for why this cannot he the case.
There are other problems with this proposition. It
is unclear in the phrase "whose attributes are different"
how we are to understand "attributes" . There are two dif-
ferent interpretations that can be given to this phrase.
One interpretation is the following: (Let Sx = x is a
substance.) (x)(y)(Sx & Sy & (3A)(A is an attribute &
Ax & ~Ay) => x has nothing in common with y) . On this in-
terpretation, if two substances differ with regard to some
attribute they then have nothing in common. One could, how-
ever, interpret the above phrase quite differently, as
follows: (x)(y)(Sx & Sy & ^(3A)(A is an attribute & Ax
& Ay) =5 x has nothing in common with y). On this inter-
pretation, if two substances differ with respect to all
their attributes then they have nothing in common. In the
first interpretation it is only necessary for the substances
to have some attribute that differs in order for the claim
that they have nothing in common to be true . In the second
interpretation the substances have nothing in common if
and only if all of their attributes differ. It is unclear
which interpretation is correct. Without a better
10
understanding of the important terms "substance" and
"attribute" we cannot begin to understand proposition II.
Consider premise 2 (proposition III) of argument A:
"Things which have nothing in common cannot the one be the
cause of the other." The proof to this proposition is:
"If they have nothing in common, it follows that one can-
not be apprehended by means of the other (Axiom V) and,
therefore, one cannot be the cause of the other (Axiom IV)."®
This argument is a reductio and can be represented as fol-
lows :
ARGUMENT D. (Reductio)
1. Suppose there are two things A
and B such that A has nothing in
common with B and A causes B.
2 . Things which have nothing in common
cannot be understood the one by
means of the other. (Axiom V)
3- B cannot be understood by means
of A. (1,2)
4. If B cannot be understood by means
of A then knowledge of B does not
depend on or involve knowledge of A.
5 • Knowledge of B does not depend on
or involve knowledge of A. (MP 3»4)
6. Knowledge of an effect depends on
and involves knowledge of its
cause. (Axiom IV)
7 . Knowledge of B depends on and
involves knowledge of A . (1,6)
8.
Spinoza, Ethics
,
47.
11
8. © 5,7
9* There cannot he two things A and
B such that A has nothing in com-
mon with B and A causes B.
This same proposition is found in the Short Treatise where
Spinoza argues that something cannot come from nothing.
There he states directly that things which do not have in
themselves something of another thing, cannot he the cause
g
of the existence of that other thing. Proposition VI is
also a restatement of proposition III, and is a more con-
vincing argument. His argument in proposition VI is that
if a substance were caused hy something other than itself
the knowledge of it would depend on the knowledge of its
cause and hence hy definition III it would not itself
he a substance. 1(^
The reason this argument is more convincing is that
the things in question in proposition VI are substances
which hy definition must he conceived through themselves.
If we grant the truth of Axiom IV ("The knowledge of an
effect depends on and involves the knowledge of a cause."
11
),
then hy definition one substance cannot cause another sub-
stance . Proposition III, as it stands, is a more general
~9i B. Spinoza. Short Treatise on God, Man and his Well-
Being, ed. John Wild (New York: Scribner's Sons, 1930),
52 -
10. Spinoza, Ethics , 48.
11. Ibid., 46.
12
statement and does not specify that the things in question
are substances. Proposition III asserts that when aiiy two
things, whether they are substances or not, have nothing in
common they cannot cause one another. Now, according to
Spinoza there are other things besides substances. In
Axiom I he says, "Everything which exists, exists either in
itself or in something else." The things which exist in
themselves Spinoza calls "substances"
. Spinoza calls the
things which exist in something else "modes". ("By mode,
I mean the modifications of substance, or that which exists
in, and is conceived through, something other than itself." 1 -^)
Given the above, it appears that proposition III can be ap-
plied to modes as well as substances. Individual physical
objects and thoughts are modes for Spinoza, and physical
objects enter into relations with other physical objects and
thoughts with other thoughts. Thus bodies are caused by
other bodies and thoughts by other thoughts. The cause and
effect relation does apply then, not only to substances and
other things, but to modes and other modes. The only stipu-
lation Spinoza makes about the cause and effect relation is
that it cannot apply to bodies and thoughts. That is, the
mind has no causal power over the body, nor the body over
the mind. "Body cannot determine mind to think, neither
12 . Spinoza. Ethics , 46 .
13- Ibid. , 45-
13
can mind determine body to motion or rest or any state dif-
ferent from these, if such there be." 1^ Taking "things"
in proposition III to be modes we get: Two things which
are conceived through something other than themselves,
where the conception of the one does not involve the con-
ception of the other cannot the one cause the other
[(X)(Y)(X is conceived through Z & Y is conceived through
W & X / Z&Y/W&W / Z => X cannot cause Y and Y cannot
cause X)]. Let X be Bill's happiness, Z be the substance
Bill, Y be John's happiness, and W be the substance John. 1^
This proposition then states that if Bill's happiness is
conceived through Bill, and John's happiness is conceived
through John (where Bill's happiness is not identical to
Bill nor John's happiness to John), and Bill's happiness is
not identical to John's happiness, then Bill's happiness
cannot cause John's happiness. Surely this is false. There
is nothing in the antecedent that precludes Bill's happiness
causing John's happiness. 1^
14 . Spinoza, Ethics , 131*
15. This way of making sense of proposition III when filled
out in this manner was suggested to me by Professor Fred
Feldman
.
16 . I realize that there is somewhat of a problem in con-
struing the modes in Spinoza's system as accidental
properties (as I will do later on), and talking about
modes causing other modes. It does sound strange to
talk about properties causing other properties. One
could think of the modes as states or quasi-indivi-
duals, and talk about states causing other states.
14
Oldenburg expresses my puzzlement over proposition
III when, in a letter to Spinoza, he states:
. . .your .. .axiom, that when things have
no quality in common, one cannot he pro-
duced by another, is not so plain to my
groping intelligence as to stand in need
of no further illumination.... your ax-
ioms are not established beyond all
assaults of doubt, [and] the propositions
you have based upon them do not appear to
me absolutely firm. 17
Spinoza answers Oldenburg by saying:
. . .it follows that, if two things have
nothing in common, one cannot be the
cause of the other. For, as there would
be nothing in common between the effect
and the cause, the whole effect would
spring from nothing. 18
So, Spinoza's further illumination is to state that unless
the effect of some cause has something in common with that
cause (can be conceived through that cause), the effect
springs from nothing. But surely this does not follow.
It does not follow from the fact that an effect cannot be
The abundance of evidence, however, does point to the
fact that Spinoza thinks of the modes as accidental
properties. Nevertheless, it seems to me that the
same objections to Spinoza's views on causality apply
whether one thinks of the modes as states or as acci-
dental properties. As will become evident, particularly
in the case of modes, there seems to be no good reason
to suppose either that knowledge of an effect depends
upon and involves knowledge of its cause, or that a
cause necessarily implies its effect.
17. Spinoza, Correspondence , 280-281.
18. Ibid.
,
283.
15
conceived through its cause, that therefore, that effect
has sprung from nothing.
It is crucial that we get a clearer understanding of
what Spinoza means when he states that two things have
nothing in common. So far all we have ascertained is that
if two things have nothing in common they cannot he con-
ceived through one another. But what does it mean to say
things have nothing in common? One possible way of under-
standing this clause is the following: X has nothing in
common with Y = ^(3Z)(Z is a mode or an attribute & X has
Z & Y has Z). In otherwords, two things have nothing in
common when there is neither an attribute nor a mode that
they share. This interpretation is supported by Spinoza's
statement
:
Two or more distinct things are distin-
guished one from the other, either by the
difference of the attributes of the sub-
stances, or by the difference of their
modifications .19
On this interpretation, proposition III states that things
which have neither a mode nor an attribute in common can-
not the one be the cause of the other. I will take this
to be the correct interpretation of proposition III since
it seems the most plausible. Argument D then, is Spinoza s
argument for the conclusion that things which share neither
attributes nor modes cannot cause one another.
19 . Spinoza, Ethics , ^7
.
16
Returning to Spinoza's argument D, it can easily be
seen that the argument is valid. But the truth of some of
the premises (for example premise 6) rests upon the accep-
tance of some very dubious assumptions. Premise 6 (Axiom
IV) of argument D, together with Axiom III ("From a given
definite cause an effect necessarily follows..." 20 ), is an
explicit statement of Spinoza's belief that the causal re-
lation is a logically necessary relation of implication;
that is, a cause necessarily implies its effect. In pre-
mise 6 Spinoza also makes an epistemological claim. Spino-
za claims not only that a cause necessarily implies its
effect, but that we cannot know an effect without knowing
its cause. ("The knowledge of an effect depends on and in-
volves the knowledge of a cause." )
Spinoza's claim that there is a necessary connection
between any cause and its effect is at the very least a
questionable claim. Prior to Hume it was commonly thought
that this was the case—that a cause compels the occurence
of its effect. Hume argued that there is in fact no such
necessary connection. He argued that we can without con-
tradiction easily imagine any cause without its effect.
Although they might be conjoined they are not connected.
With Hume, and against Spinoza, I think that the idea of
20 . Spinoza, Ethics , 46
.
21. Ibid.
17
any cause is perfectly separable from its effect, and hence
there is no necessary connection between a cause and its
effect
.
Furthermore, Spinoza's epistemological claim in pre-
mise 6 of argument D seems false. It seems perfectly con-
sistent to claim knowledge of an effect without knowledge
of its cause. A counter-example to this claim can be found
in the area of medicine. There are many diseases (effects)
for which we do not know the causes, yet it makes sense to
say we know the effects (the diseases). We can, without
contradiction, make the statement that we know the effects
of many unknown causes. Of course, it can be argued that
we cannot know it is an effect without knowing it is the
effect of some cause. The notion of an effect only makes
sense in reference to the notion of a cause. But, this is
not Spinoza's claim in premise 6. His claim is that with-
out knowing the cause of a certain effect we cannot know
that effect. This clearly seems false. Suppose, however,
that Spinoza is not claiming that we cannot in any sense
know the effect of some cause without knowing the cause,
but rather that we cannot fully or totally know the effect.
Spinoza would then be claiming that you cannot have full
knowledge of a thing without knowing its cause . This is
certainly a more plausible claim. Whether this claim is
true depends upon what is meant by "full" knowledge of a
18
22thing. Does this mean everything there is to know about
it? It seems a criterion as strict as this would prevent
us from ever knowing anything. It is unclear how we are
to understand premise 6 in argument D. Without a better
understanding of this premise, the soundness of Spinoza's
argument ( to show that two things having nothing in common
cannot the one cause the other) cannot be established.
These are the preliminary problems with premise 2
(proposition III) of argument A. Further problems with
this premise will have to await the discussion of Spinoza's
notions of "substance" and "attributes" in the chapters
which follow.
Consider premise 6 (proposition V) of argument A:
"There cannot exist in the university two or more substances
having the same nature or attribute." The proof for this
proposition is:
If several distinct fdistinctae l sub-
stances be granted, they must be dis-
tinguished
1
distingui l one from the
other, either by the difference of
their attributes, or by the difference
of their modifications (Prop. iv.).
If only by the difference of their
attributes, it will be granted that
there cannot be more than one with an
identical attribute . If by the dif-
ference of their modifications--as
22. Spinoza holds that a true idea or thought is self-
evident. As such it would seem that in Spinoza's
own system knowledge of the cause of these true
thoughts is not necessary for knowledge of the true
idea
.
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substance is naturally prior to its
modifications (Prop. i.),--it follows
that setting the modifications aside,
and considering substance in itself,
that is truly, (Deff. iii . and vi
. )
,
there cannot be conceived one substance
different fdistingui l from another, --
that is (by Prop, iv
. )
,
there cannot
be granted several substances, but one
substance only. 2 3
The first thing to be noticed about the above proof is
that it does not prove the proposition it is intended to
prove . The proof given as the proof for proposition V is
not a proof for the conclusion that no two substances can
have the same attribute, but rather a proof for the conclu-
sion that there is only one substance . Spinoza does not
even attempt to prove proposition V, but simply asserts that
it will be granted that there cannot be more than one sub-
stance with an identical attribute . This is apparently so
obvious to Spinoza that it needs no further illumination.
Yet once again the obviousness eludes me. From the fact
that X and Y are substances that are distinct but have an
attribute in common, we are supposed to arrive at a con-
tradiction. But what is the contradiction? Is there some-
thing about the notion of "attribute" that precludes there
being two substances with an identical attribute? In order
to answer this question it is necessary to turn to the defi-
nition of the term "attribute". Before I do, however, there
23 . Spinoza, Ethics , 4?.
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is one more problem with the proof to proposition V that
should be mentioned. Spinoza seems to commit a fallacy in
the proof to proposition V
. The fallacy consists in using
the word " distinc tae ” in two quite different senses. The
word " distinctae " can mean either qualitatively distinct
or numerically distinct. Spinoza uses it in both senses.
In the premise he is talking about substances which are
qualitatively distinct, whereas in the conclusion he asserts
numerical distinction. Spinoza makes the assumption that
the same content cannot belong to a plurality of substances,
and from that he derives the conclusion that there cannot
be a plurality of substances of the same nature . The whole
proof to proposition V seems to be based on this play of
words
.
In order to understand what proposition V asserts it
is necessary to determine Spinoza's definition for the term
"attribute". He defines "attribute" as, "...that which
the intellect perceives as constituting the essence of
24 / .
substance." (The important question of whether an attri-
bute really does constitute the essence of substance will
be discussed in Chapter II
. ) Given that an attribute is
supposed to constitute the essence of substance, it is
necessary that we know how Spinoza defines the word "essence".
24 . Spinoza, Ethics , 45
•
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Spinoza does not define "essence" until Part II of the
Ethics . There "essence" is defined as follows:
I consider as belonging to the essence
of a thing that, which being given, the
thing is necessarily given also, and
which, being removed, the thing is neces-
sarily removed also; in other words, that
without which the thing, and which itself
without the thing, can neither be nor be
conceived . 25
Both the terms "attribute" and "essence" are crucial in an
analysis of proposition V. These terms will be thoroughly
discussed in Chapters II and III. All I wish to point out
here are some preliminary problems with these terms and the
propositions they are supposed to support.
One preliminary problem has already been mentioned.
That is, we are never given any proof of proposition V. It
is supposed to be self-evident. Yet it is far from being
self-evident. Now that we have the definitions of "attribute"
and "essence" proposition V should become clearer, and
indeed at first sight it does become clearer. Given the
definitions of "attribute" and "essence", proposition V
does seem to follow. That is, it appears to follow from
the definition of "attribute" that, if two substances pos-
sess the same attribute then they would possess the same
essence . In this case there would be no reason to speak
of them as "two", for they would be indistinguishable,
25* Spinoza, Ethics , 82.
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i_L§_jL> not distinct . This issue, unfortunately
,
is much more
complicated than it first appeal's* To begin with, it is not
at all clear from Spinoza's definition of "essence" that if
two substances share an attribute then they share the same
essence . It could be that sharing an attribute means shar-
ing an essential property, and it does not follow from this
that the substances in question would be the same substances.
This proposition would be much more plausible if we under-
stood Spinoza to mean by "same nature or attribute" that
no two substances can share all their attributes and be dis-
tinct. For if two things share all of their properties,
then by Leibniz' Law they are identical. But in the proof
to proposition V Spinoza says that there cannot be more than
one substance with an identical attribute
,
and it is far
from clear why this cannot be the case. Again we are left
in the dark without a better understanding of the terms
"attribute" and "substance".
This concludes the preliminary discussion of some of
the problems with Spinoza's arguments for the conclusion
that there is only one substance in the universe. Follow-
ing is a discussion of the terms embedded in the various
arguments (and related problems), which are necessary for
an understanding of proposition XIV
.
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CHAPTER II
ATTRIBUTES
Perhaps the most perplexing, and certainly the most
discussed, problem in Spinoza scholarship is the determi-
nation of the status ( i .e
.
, the "subjectivity” or "objec-
tivity") of the attributes of substance.
Determination of the status of the attributes has im-
portant consequences for many of Spinoza's claims, parti-
cularly for his claim that there is only one substance in
the university.
The problematic character of this issue arises from
the different translations, and hence interpretations, that
can be given to Spinoza's definition of "attribute". There-
fore, the only way to clarify this ambiguity is by examining,
directly and thoroughly, his definition in the original La-
tin text. Spinoza defines the term "attribute" as follows:
Per attributum intelligo id, quod
intellectus de substantia percipit,
tanquam ejusdem essentia constituens.
[By attribute I understand, that which
the intellect perceives of substance,
as constituting its essence.]!
XT Benedicti De Spinoza, Opera I, J. Van Vloten et
J. P. N. Land, MCMXIII, Apud Martinum Nijhoff, 5^
•
English translation mine
.
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There are two basic positions advanced concerning the
meaning of this definition--traditionally referred to as
the "subjectivist" versus the "ob jectivist" position.
To examine each "subjectivist's" and "ob jectivist ' s"
interpretation of this definition is beyond the scope of
this paper. The purpose of clarification can be accom-
plished by an examination of how certain representative
"subjectivist" and "ob jectivist" scholars interpret this
definition and the reasons for their respective interpre-
tations. I shall first present the "subjectivist" and
"ob jectivist" positions without clarification. Then I
shall attempt to clarify and critically examine their
positions. My own interpretation of Spinoza's definition
will emerge in this discussion.
The "subjectivists" make the following claims about
the attributes: 1) They argue that Spinoza thinks of the
concepts we have of the attributes of God as inventions of
the human mind. Ideas of God's attributes are simply con-
ceptions we form of the essence of substance, or God, from
the way in which the substance appears to us in our experi-
ence . They are simply mental constructs, or forms of cog-
nition. 2) The human mind, according to the "subjectivists",
is incapable of achieving any real knowledge of God or sub-
stance . 3) The concepts we form of the attributes of sub-
stance are not true characterizations of substance. In
25
otherwords, our ideas of the attributes of substance do
not have a correlate in reality, or to use Spinoza's termi-
nology, the ideas of the essence of substance ( i .e . , the
ideas of the attributes) do not correspond to the ideatum
( i'6- i the object of the ideas). Using a terminology that
both Descartes and Spinoza employ, one could say that the
"subjectivists" argue that the "objective reality" (the
attributes as they are presented to us by our ideas of
them) has no corresponding "formal reality" ( i .e
.
,
our ideas
have no correspondence to the essence of substance itself).
As is evident from the three claims presented above,
the "subjectivists" are making both ontological and epis-
temological claims. They not only claim that the attributes
have no reality apart from the perceiving mind (similar to
Berkeley's view), but that as "mental constructs" they pro-
vide us with no knowledge of substance itself.
The "ob jectivists"
,
on the contrary, maintain that our
concepts of the attributes do correctly characterize the
essence of substance. That is, our ideas of substance do
correspond to the ideatum , the "objective reality" to the
"formal reality" . They further argue that the human mind
can and does have knowledge of substance or God. (That
is, this "correspondence" between idea and object is one
that is evident.) The "ob jectivists" agree with the
"subjectivists" that it is the intellect that perceives
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the attributes. They disagree, however, that what is
perceived by the intellect has no corresponding ideatum .
The "objectivists" argue that the attributes are both
perceived by the intellect and present in substance as its
essence
.
I will attempt to further clarify and evaluate the
"subjectivist"/"objectivist" positions after the presen-
tation of these positions by representative advocates.
H. A. Wolfson, a "subjectivist", points out that two
very different interpretations can be given to Spinoza’s
definition of "attribute", depending on which part of the
definition one stresses. If one emphasizes the expression
"which the intellect perceives", the definition may be
taken to state that the attributes of substance have only
"mental existence" and do not correctly refer to the pro-
perties of substance itself. If, however, one stresses
the phrase "constituting the essence of substance", it
seems that the attributes really exist outside the mind,
in res
,
and are the things out of which the essence of sub-
stance is composed. Wolfson states this in the following
passage
:
If the expression "which the intellect
perceives" is laid stress upon, it
would seem that attributes are only in
intellectu . Attributes would thus be
only a subjective mode of thinking, ex-
pressing a relation to a perceiving
subject and having no real existence
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in the essence. On the other hand,
if only the latter part of the defi-
nition is taken notice of, namely,
"constituting the essence of a sub-
stance," it wuld seem that the attri-
butes are extra intellectum
, real ele-
ments out of which the essence of the
substance is composed. 2
Wolfson chooses the "subjective" interpretation, and there-
fore stresses the phrase, "which the intellect perceives."
According to Wolfson, what we think of as the attributes
of God are only inventions of the mind--mental entities--
with no real existence in substance itself or, for that
matter, in any existent thing outside the mind. Our con-
cepts of the attributes are only a subjective mode of
• • -3
thinking, expressing a relation to a perceiving subject.
Wolfson' s "subjective" interpretation of Spinoza was
originally proposed by Erdmann. Erdmann feels that the
attributes are not really properties of a substance, but
rather "forms of cognition" in the human subject. Accord-
ing to Erdmann, the attributes are inventions of the human
mind which are set up in order to constitute a means of
conceiving the substance . Our concept of the attributes
is simply a subjective device with the implication that
they (the attributes) have no place in God or substance
2. H. A. Wolfson, The Philosophy of Spinoza Vol. I (New
York: Schocken, 1969) * 1^6
.
3 • Ibid
.
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at all. Unlike Platonic "forms” which are abstract but
not necessarily "subjective", Erdmann feels that Spinoza's
attributes are both "forms of cognition" and necessarily
"subjective". God, according to Erdmann, is absolute and
unknowable in Spinoza's system. Since God is unknowable,
neither our ideas of God's attributes, nor anything else
can provide us with any real knowledge of God's essence or
nature. Wolfson develops Erdmann's interpretation and
attempts to trace Spinoza's thought to his medieval pre-
decessors .
There are many reasons why Wolfson holds a "subjective"
interpretation of the attributes. The most important rea-
son is his belief that Spinoza’s thought is very closely
akin to certain medievals like Maimonides . Seeing Spinoza
so closely related to the medievals, Wolfson finds support
for the "subjective" interpretation in the medieval asser-
tion that God is unknowable. Wolfson states, "The God
or substance of Spinoza, like the God of the medieval ra-
tionalists, is unknowable in His essence.""’ Elsewhere he
states
,
. . .Spinoza has adopted the traditional
term "attribute", and makes use of it
lf~. This discussion occurs in Wolfson, Spinoza Vol. I,
146-147, and is there attributed to J. E. Erdmann (Ed.),
Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie, II, 272.6.
5 - Ibid. , 142.
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as a description of the manner in
which substance, unknowable in it-
self, manifests itself to the hu-
man mind .6
Wolfson offers as textual support for his view two passages
from the Correspondence . The first passage reads: "...the
existence of God is His essence, and of His essence we can
7form no general idea..."' The second passage that Wolfson
refers to is a section from one of Spinoza's letters to
Simon De Vries, where Spinoza attempts to elucidate for
De Vries the nature of an attribute. This very interesting
passage reads as follows:
. . .by Israel is meant the third pat-
riarch; I mean the same by Jacob, the
name Jacob being given, because the
patriarch in question had caught hold
of the heel of his brother. Secondly,
by a colourless surface I mean a sur-
face, which reflects all rays of light
without altering them. I mean the same
by a white surface, with this difference,
that a surface is called white in re-
ference to a man looking at it, &c .8
Wolfson sees this passage as support for the "subjective"
interpretation of the attributes. The surface is called
white relative to a man's perception of it. So it is with the
attributes--they are relative to our perceptions of them.
Z~. Wolfson
,
Spinoza Vol. I, 145 •
7. Spinoza, Correspondence , 369 *
8 . Ibid .
,
316 .
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Their existence depends on perception, and they are real
only in the sense that someone perceives them as real. As
W. Teo has pointed out, for Wolfson the attributes "...seem
to be something like colored glasses. What a man perceives
through the particular glasses he happens to be using at
the time would be considered a substance. Wolfson
concludes, "...it is not as a mere turn of speech that
Spinoza always refers to attribute in subjective terms...
[for it] is called attribute with respect to the intellect." 10
Wolfson offers two further reasons for a "subjective"
interpretation of the attributes. One reason is that he be-
lieves there are other passages in Spinoza which support
this view. For example, in proposition XII in Part I of
the Ethics Spinoza states, "No attribute of substance can
be conceived from which it would follow that substance can
be divided." 11 Wolfson claims that this passage supports
the "subjective" interpretation. He says,
While the definition of attribute
states affirmatively the subjective
nature of attributes by declaring
that they are only perceived by
the mind, the proposition [XII)
W. K. Teo, "The Relation of Substance to Attributes
in Spinoza," Kinesis 1, Fall 1968, 17.
10. Wolfson, Spinoza Vol. I, 152.
11. Spinoza, Ethics , 5^*
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denies any independent reality to
attributes by which the simplicity
of the substance would be endan-
gered .12
Wolfson feels that if the attributes of a substance are
really present in the essence of the substance, then the
simplicity of the substance would be destroyed. He can
see no way that the attributes can be real within a simple
substance .
Also, according to Wolfson, if the "subjective" inter-
pretation is maintained we can eliminate the problem raised
by such scholars as Martineau, who states, "How that essence
can be one and self-identical, while its constituents are
many, heterogeneous and unrelated, is a question which is
13hopeless of solution." v Wolfson is pointing to the problem,
originally raised by De Vries, of the apparent contradiction
between the plurality of the attributes and the fact that
there is only one substance. There is no contradiction,
according to Wolfson, if the attributes of the one substance
are simply inventions of the human mind.
This is the "subjectivist" interpretation of the attri-
butes in the words of its most representative advocate, H.
A. Wolfson.
12 . Wolfson, Spinoza Vol. I, 156.
13- J. Martineau, A Study of Spinoza (London: Macmillan,
1882), 185 •
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As demonstrated through the examination of Wolfson
and Erdmann, the "subjectivists” make three claims: 1)
Our concepts of the attributes of God are inventions of the
human mind, "mental constructs" or "forms of cognition."
2) The human mind cannot know substance or God. 3) Our
concepts of the attributes do not have correlates in sub-
stance itself . I shall argue against all three of the
"subjectivist" claims in what follows.
First, it is unclear what the "subjectivists" mean
when they say that our concepts of the attributes are in-
ventions of the human mind, or "mental constructs." I
have interpreted this to mean that our concepts of the
attributes are simply conceptions we form of the essence of
substance from the way in which substance appears to us in
our experience. I realize, however, that this does not
offer much clarification. The terminology is obscure.
Second, the claim that our ideas of the attributes do
not correctly characterize substance (claim 3) is supposed
to follow from both claims 1 and 2.
The "subjectivists" think that from the claim that
our ideas of the attributes are "forms of cognition" or
"mental constructs" (claim 1), it follows that our ideas
cannot correctly characterize substance. This is mistaken.
Even if we grant that our ideas of the attributes are
"mental constructs," nothing whatsoever follows about the
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status of the attributes as true or false charac teriza—
tions of substance • It is possible for them to be "inven-
tions of the human mind" and to refer correctly to the
essential properties of substance.
The "subjectivists" must apparently also think that
from the epistemological claim that the human mind cannot
know substance or God (claim 2), the ontological claim that
our concepts of the attributes have no corresponding ideata
(claim 3) follows. This argument might be represented as
follows: (A) If our concepts of the attributes correspond
to the essence of substance itself, then God or substance
for Spinoza is knowable
.
(B) But, God or substance for
Spinoza is unknowable. (C) Therefore, our concepts of the
attributes do not correspond to the essence of substance
itself
.
Even if we grant the claim that God for Spinoza is
unknowable (a claim I do not grant), premise A is false.
Our concepts of the attributes of substance can both corres-
pond to the essence of substance as it is in itself (the
ideatum ) and substance can still be unknowable. That is,
there could be an accidental correlation of our ideas of
the attributes of God with those attributes as they are in
substance itself (with His actual properties), and yet we
have no way of knowing this
.
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The "subjectivists" also seem to feel that it follows
from claims 1 and 2 together that our ideas of the attri-
butes do not correctly characterize substance itself. They
think it follows from the fact that our ideas of the attri-
butes are "inventions of the human mind," together with the
fact that the human mind cannot know substance or God, that
therefore an idea of an attribute does not have a correspond
ing ideatum ( i .e . , does not correspond to the essence of sub
stance as it is in itself). But all that follows from
claims 1 and 2 is that there is no way of knowing whether
our ideas of the attributes really capture the real essence
of substance . It does not follow that our ideas of the
attributes dn not capture the real essence of substance
.
The "subjectivists", therefore, have no argument for
claim 3. It is possible for our ideas of the attributes to
be "inventions of the human mind," for God to be unknowable
and yet for an idea of an attribute to have a corresponding
ideatum .
Further, if we understand the "subjectivist" claim
to be the claim that the only reality the attributes of
substance have is in the mind, or in our idea of them, then
it seems that they are attributing to Spinoza the view that
substance is what has been called a "bare particular." On
this view when the perceiving mind is not present, the
attributes also are not present, although substance is
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left intact, that is, intact as an undifferentiated,
attributeless "bare particular." When Wolfson says that
substance is, "...absolutely simple, free from accidental
as well as from essential attributes..." 1^ he seems to be
attributing the above view to Spinoza. As will be shown
in Chapter IV, no such view can be attributed to him. Also,
this seems inconsistent with Wolfson's claim that we cannot
know what substance is . For how can we know that substance
is "absolutely simple," if substance is said to be unknow-
able .
Third, the claim that for Spinoza the human mind cannot
possibly know substance or God is false. Spinoza repeatedly
claims that the finite mind can have an adequate knowledge
of God through the attributes that it does understand. Spi-
noza states in the Correspondence , " . . .1 do not assert that
I thoroughly know God, but that I understand some of His
attributes, ...and...my ignorance of very many does not
hinder the knowledge I have of some In the Ethics he
states, "The human mind has an adequate knowledge of the
eternal and infinite essence of God."
1
^ He also declares,
"
. . .the infinite essence and the eternity of God are
lk . Wolfson. Spinoza Vol. I, 116
.
15. Spinoza, Correspondence , 387-
16. Spinoza, Ethics , 118.
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17known to all." In the Short Treatise Spinoza says,
"
• . .here we speak only of attributes which might be
called ’proper attributes' of God, through v/hich we come
to know Him [as He is] in Himself..." Spinoza suggests
here that our ideas of the "proper attributes" (by which
I understand him to mean extension and thought), do show
us God as He is in Himself. These and other quotations
offer conclusive evidence against the premise in the
"subjectivist" argument which states that the human mind
cannot know God or substance
.
Further arguments in the Short Treatise support the
claim that Spinoza believes the human mind can and does
know God. Our ideas of the attributes cannot only be mis-
leading inventions of the human mind. The perception of the
attributes must have as its source the objective presence
of the attributes in substance
.
Spinoza tells us that neither the existence nor the
essence of anything ever depends upon us.
I therefore see now that the truth, es-
sence, or existence of anything never
depends on me . .
.
From what has been
said so far it is clearly manifest that
the idea of infinite attributes in the
perfect being is no fiction... 19
17 . Spinoza. Ethics , 118.
18. Spinoza, Short Treatise , 59-
19. Ibid. , 47-48.
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This is clearly an explicit rejection of "the "suh jectivist"
position. In this same passage Spinoza goes on to ask how
we arrive at the idea of infinitely many attributes in a
substance
.
And whence comes this idea of perfec-
tion? This something cannot be the
outcome of these two [attributes]:
for two can only yield two, and not
an infinity. Whence then? From my-
self, never; else I must be able to
give what I did not possess. Whence
then, but from the infinite attributes
themselves which tell us that they are,
without however telling us, at the same
time, what they are: for only two do
we know what they are .^0
Here Spinoza explicitly says that we cannot invent the ideas
of the attributes, because we do not have it within our power
to do so. Ideas of the attributes, he argues, must come from
a reality outside the intellect, namely in the infinite at-
tributes themselves.
Also, Wolfson's "subjective" interpretation cannot be
sustained by passages where Spinoza says that the attributes
are distinguished from substance by the intellect. For it
does not follow from the fact that the intellect perceives
the attributes, that therefore the distinction which the
intellect perceives is not real. Wolfson places a mistaken
emphasis on the relation of the attributes to the intellect.
It is not the case that for Spinoza anything perceived by
20. Spinoza, Short Treatise , 48.
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the intellect is necessarily "subjective". As Parkinson
21has pointed out, Spinoza states in the Ethics
, "Reason
perceives this necessity of things truly--that is, as it
22is m itself." Spinoza further states that, "The order
and connection of ideas is the same as the order and con-
23
nection of things." As a matter of fact, even Wolfson
seems to contradict his own position and give support to
the "objectivist" view when, in talking about proposition
XI
,
he says
,
Starting therefore with the definition
of attribute as "that which the intel-
lect perceives of substance, as if con-
stituting the essence of substance" and
assuming it to be a true proprium of
substance, Spinoza concludes... 2^
[Underlining mine
.
]
So, although Spinoza holds that it is the intellect that
perceives the attributes, it is not the case that what the
intellect perceives is of necessity subjective. Our ideas
of the attributes are not mere "as ifs" through which we
approach an ultimately unintelligible being. Attributes
are not posited by the intellect as belonging to a sub-
stance which in actuality is without them. Although
TT. G. H. R. Parkinson, Spinoza's Theory of Knowledge
(Oxford: Clarendon Press , 1954 )» 85*
22. Spinoza, Ethics , 117-
23. Ibid
.
,
86.
24. Wolfson, Spinoza Vol. I, l4l.
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Wolfson's interpretation does not lack "an exegetical
pedigree" (M. S. Gram), his representative subjectivist
view is mistaken.
The "ob jectivists" also question Wolfson's view
that the attributes are "subjective". Marjorie Grene
,
for example, wonders if our ideas of the attributes through
which we are to understand God or Nature are "mere 'as-ifs'
through which we approach an ultimately unintelligible ground
or being," or whether they refer to independent entities in
their own right. ^ Three representative scholars of the
"ob jectivist" position are G. H. R. Parkinson, E. Powell
and H. Joachim.
G. H. R. Parkinson views the problem of attributes as
one of translation. He feels that those like Wolfson, who
have taken a subjective view, have simply mistranslated
one of the words in Spinoza's definition of "attribute".
The word Parkinson thinks has been mistranslated is the
Latin word " tanquam " . As Parkinson correctly points out,
in Latin " tanquam " can be rendered as either "as" or "as if".
Parkinson feels that those who have taken a "subjectivist"
position have translated " tanquam " to read "as if" instead
of "as” . Parkinson feels that if we translate the defini-
tion of "attribute" as, "that which the intellect perceives
25 . M. Grene. ed.. Spinoza (New York: Anchor Press, 1973 )*
xi .
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as_ constituting the essence of substance," instead of "that
which the intellect perceives as if constituting the essence
of substance," we would no longer be inclined to think, of the
attributes as subjective. Parkinson claims that to trans-
late " tanquam " as "as if" involves a misconception of Spi-
noza's view of the nature of the intellect. He quotes Spi-
noza's passage in the Ethics which states: "Reason per-
ceives this necessity of things truly—that is, as it is in
27itself." Based on this quotation Parkinson concludes that
p Qthe attributes are not mere "subjective modes of perception."
E. Powell, like Parkinson, argues against the "subjec-
tive" interpretation of the attributes. An interesting
aspect of Powell's interpretation is that he makes use of
precisely the same passage in Spinoza to demonstrate his
"ob jectivist" position that Wolfson takes as evidence for
the "subjective" view. The passage Powell and Wolfson refer
to is that quoted previously, where Spinoza attempts to show
how two things may properly be called by two names. (Please
refer to page 29, footnote 8.) As seen previously, Wolf-
son takes this passage as support for the view that the
attributes are relative to our interpretation of them.
26 . Parkinson, Spinoza's Theory , 85
•
27* Spinoza, Ethics , 117*
28. Parkinson, Spinoza's Theory , 85-
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Powell interprets this passage very differently. He agrees
that at first reading the passage does sound very much like
the language of phenomenalism. He claims, however, that,
It is certain that Spinoza never aims
to he a phenomenalist
; he is always in
intention a thorough-going realist.
Knowledge for him is knowledge of reali-
ty in the most literal sense of the term
. . .an interpretation of the passage in the
sense of conscious and express phenomenal-
ism, would place it in sharp contradiction
with the tenor and complexion of his whole
system .29
Powell goes on to give his reading of the passage . He
thinks this passage conveys Spinoza's belief that although
"attribute" and "substance" may be distinguished in thought,
they cannot be separated except by the intellect. In ob-
jective reality the attributes never exist distinct from
substance. He states:
Attribute and substance cannot be sepa-
rated, though they may be distinguished
in thought... These cannot be separated
any more than Israel and Jacob, or than
the whiteness of the plane and the plane
itself. But they may be distinguished in
thought, attribute refering to substance
in its qualitative aspect, just as "Jacob"
applies to Israel, though refering es-
pecially to the patriarch's posture at
birth .30
29 . E. Powell, Spinoza and Religion (Chicago: Open Court
Co., 1906), 119.
30 . Ibid.
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This is obviously a very different interpretation than the
one Wolfson presents. For Powell, the attributes are ob-
jectively real, as real as substance itself, for in reali-
ty a substance and its attributes are one and the same
thing. This is a very interesting view of the relationship
between a substance and its attributes, a view which will
be discussed at much greater length in Chapter VI, where
Curley's interpretation of Spinoza is considered. (As will
be seen, Curley is in agreement with Powell on this issue.)
H. Joachim, an "ob jectivist"
,
takes a slightly dif-
ferent approach than Parkinson or Powell. Joachim argues
that Spinoza can consistently claim both that a substance
has an infinite number of attributes, and that each attri-
bute is identical with the substance . The attributes are
"
. . .ultimate characteristics of reality, in the sense that
11
neither can be reduced to the terms of the other. And,
substance is the same in each attribute, since each attri-
32bute expresses what substance is.
On the face of it this interpretation is self-contra-
dictory. To hold that a substance is the same in each
attribute and that each attribute is separate from and
irreducible to any other implies that a substance both is
JT. H. Joachim. A Study of Spinoza (New York: Russell &
Russell, 19^4 ) , 22 .
32. Ibid. , 26.
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is not identical with its attributes • Joachim seeks to
avoid this difficulty by saying that the attributes of a
substance appear to be diverse for the intellect. He feels
that there can be an infinite number of attributes, each of
which expresses totally the essence of substance, while there
is a distinction between one attribute and each of the other
attributes as they appear to the perceiving intellect. In
this way he feels the contradiction is removed. He is not
saying that a substance is both identical and not identical
to its attributes. Rather, the perceiving intellect per-
ceives substance differently as it perceives the different
attributes it has. As such, it is not substance, but our
view of substance in relation to each of its attributes,
which is different.
As M. Gram points out, Joachim recognizes two rela-
tions involved in the substance/attribute relation. There
is the relation of identity, which holds between a substance
and its attributes apart from any relation it has to the
intellect. And there is the relation of difference, which
holds between an attribute and a substance as it is known
33
to the intellect.
As textual support for his view, Joachim offers two
passages from the Ethics . One passage is Spinoza's definition
333 M. Gram, "Spinoza, Substance, and Predication,” Theoria ,
Voi . xxxiv, 1968, 229.
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of "attribute". Joachim reads this definition as
support for the claim that the attributes are in part
affected by the knowing intellect, i .e
.
,
an attribute is
v/hat the intellect perceives. That the attributes are also
present in substance, Joachim supports by the part of the
definition of "attribute" which reads, "constituting the
essence of substance," and by Spinoza's proposition that
"nothing is granted in addition to the understanding, ex-
34
cept substance and its modifications." Since an attri-
bute is obviously not a modification of substance, accord-
ing to Joachim, it must in some sense be identical with
33 ...
substance. ^ So, for Joachim the attributes are objectively
real, though subjectively perceived.
This is the "ob jectivist" interpretation of the attri-
butes in the words of three of its most representative
advocates. What I will now show is that although the
"ob jectivist" position is in principle correct, the ad-
vocates of this position represented have not properly
interpreted Spinoza.
34 . Spinoza, Ethic's , 47 .
35 . Joachim, A Study , 17-18. (I realize that the explica-
tion given of Joachim's view offers little clarifica-
tion. I think, however, the fault lies not so much in
my explication, but rather in the fact that his view
makes very little sense , or is at the very least ex-
tremely obscure . )
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The sub jective/objective question cannot be solved
along the lines suggested by Parkinson. It is not the
case that those who have taken a subjective interpretation
of the attributes have done so because they have mistrans-
lated " tanquam ”
.
We cannot rely on translation without answering the
subjective/objective question. The translation of " tanquam ”
cannot be used to elicit the correct interpretation of
Spinoza's definition of "attribute". Without previous
knowledge of the correct interpretation we cannot arrive
at the proper translation. Those who have taken a "subjec-
tive" position have done so because they have misunderstood
the real nature of the intellect for Spinoza. They have done
what Hampshire warns against: they have been "...faithful
to their own age ."'5
"Ob jectivists" like Joachim and Powell also misinter-
pret Spinoza. For example, Joachim cannot use passages in
Spinoza where Spinoza says that nothing exists except a
substance and its modifications as proof for the "objective"
position. These passages only state that an attribute is
not a modification of a substance. They do not tell any-
thing about the relationship that exists between a sub-
stance and its attributes. Furthermore, as will become
36 . S . Hampshire , "Spinoza and the Idea of Freedom," in
Spinoza
,
M. Grene
,
ed., 297*
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evident in the chapter on De Vries, the "objective" posi-
tion of people like Joachim and Powell creates more pro-
blems that it solves. On their interpretation the pro-
blem of how substance can be one and its attributes many
is doubly acute .
The most fatal flaw, however, to all of the interpre-
tations considered is that they have all assumed incorrectly
that the intellect referred to in Spinoza's definition of
"attribute" is the finite human intellect. The word " in-
tellectus " in Spinoza's definition can refer to two dif-
ferent things. It can either refer to the "infinite in-
tellect of God" or to the finite intellect of human beings.
The most important difference between the infinite intellect
and the finite intellect is that the latter is limited, and
as such can only conceive two of God's attributes. Spinoza
compares our understanding with that of a fictitious worm
living in the bloodstream trying to make sense of its
surroundings. This little worm, he says, would live in the
blood as we live in part of the universe . It would observe
the blood, but fail to notice that each drop of blood acts
as it does because of the nature of the bloodstream as a
whole. We, like the worm, remain ignorant of how the whole
and its parts are connected. We can acquire the convic-
tion that every part of nature is related to the whole,
but to truly know this is impossible for the human mind,
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since "then it would be necessary "to know all of nature and
37its parts.
As mentioned, all the above scholars assume that the
intellect in question in Spinoza’s definition is the finite
intellect. Wolfson explicitly states, "By the term ’in-
tellect’ in this definition Spinoza means the finite hu-
O O
man intellect." But, it must be asked, is such an assump-
tion warranted? I believe it is not. It cannot be the case
that "attribute" is defined as that (and only that) which
the finite intellect perceives of substance, since Spinoza
asserts both that, 1) the finite intellect can perceive
only two attributes, and 2) there are an infinite number
of attributes. Since the attributes are infinite, no finite
intellect could perceive them all. Only the infinite in-
39tellect can perceive an infinite number of attributes. '
Since all the attributes are attributes of substance, and
since only the infinite intellect can conceive them all,
it must be the case that the intellect Spinoza refers to
in his definition of "attribute" is the infinite intellect
of God. A passage from the Ethics supports this view.
37 . Spinoza, Correspondence , 291*
38. Wolfson, Spinoza Yol. I, 153*
39 . For an excellent discussion on this issue see F. S.
Haserot, "Spinoza's Definition of Attribute," Philo-
sophical Review 62 (1953), 499-513* Unfortunately
Haserot' s article has largely been ignored.
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Spinoza states, "...whatsoever \_ i .e
.
,
the attributes! can
be perceived by the infinite intellect as constituting the
essence of substance, belongs altogether only to one sub-
40
stance." This passage shows that the term "intellect"
in Spinoza's definition of "attribute" must at the very
least apply to the infinite intellect. It is clear then,
that the vast majority of Spinoza scholars are mistaken in
assuming that " intellectus " in Spinoza's definition of
"attribute" definitely refers to the finite intellect.
Since Spinoza clearly means by "intellect" the infi-
nite intellect, it seems that the subjective/objective
question so long debated by scholars is easily resolved.
No one could question that what the infinite intellect
perceives it perceives truly. It is only when one incor-
rectly identifies the intellect as only the finite intel-
lect that the problem ever arises. The infinite intellect
can perceive things only as they are in reality, for the
infinite intellect is active and subject to no inadequate
ideas. "Subjectivists" such as Wolfson, therefore, are mis-
taken. Arguments which attempt to show that the finite
intellect perceives things truly are unnecessary. The
entire subjective/objective debate dissolves when one
40 . Spinoza, Ethics , 86 .
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realizes that the intellect in question is the infinite
intellect of God.
I have just discussed the attributes of substance for
Spinoza. It has been argued that Spinoza is not a "sub-
jectivist” with regard to the existence of attributes in
substance . The attributes are real aspects of substance
.
They are mind independent, and hence would exist even if
there were no minds to perceive them.
It is, at this point, appropriate to say something
about Spinoza's views on universals . He appears to be a
conceptualist with regard to the existence of universals.
According to him, general ideas or universals originate
because human beings are only capable of distinctly form-
ing a limited number of images. When this number becomes
too large the images get confused. If the number becomes
excessively large, the distinct individual images all
blend into one another. Spinoza states:
. . . transcendental Cs such as Being, Thing,
Some thing .. .arose from the fact, that the
human body, being limited, is only
capable of distinctly forming a cer-
tain number of images .. .within itself
at the same time; if this number be
exceeded, the images will begin to be
confused; if this number of images,
which the body is capable of forming
distinctly within itself, be largely
exceeded, all will become entirely
confused one with another. This be-
ing so, it is evident ... that the human
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mind can distinctly imagine as
many things simultaneously, as its
body can form images simultaneously.
When the images become quite con-
fused in the body, the mind also ima-
gines all bodies confusedly without
any distinction, and will comprehend
them, as it were, under one attribute,
namely, under the attribute of Being,
Thing
,
&c .^1
Spinoza goes on to say:
From similar causes arise those no-
tions, which we call general
,
such
as man, horse, dog, &c . They arise,
to wit, from the fact that so many
images, for instance, of men, are
formed simultaneously in the human
mind, that the powers of imagination
break down, not indeed utterly, but
to the extent of the mind losing
count of small differences between
individuals ( e .g , colour, size, &c .
)
and their definite number, and only
distinctly imagining that, in which
all the individuals, in so far as
the body is affected by them, agree;
for that is the point, in which each
of the said individuals chiefly
affected the body; this the mind ex-
presses by the name man, and this it
predicates of an infinite number of
particular individuals. For, as we
have said, it is unable to imagine ^
the definite number of individuals
.
Hence, for Spinoza (as Parkinson has correctly pointed
out), a universal "...is an imagination of a vague and con-
fused kind."^ Again, for Spinoza, universals represent
41 . Spinoza, Ethics , 111-112.
42. Ibid .
,
112.
43 - Parkinson, Theory of Knowledge , 149*
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"...ideas in the highest degree confused."^1 Elsewhere he
states, "...abstract notions are nothing but modes of ima-
. . 45ginmg ..."
Given Spinoza's understanding of the problem of uni-
versals (a conceptualist ' s understanding), one can reason-
ably ask whether his views on them are consistent with an
understanding of attributes as objective aspects of sub-
stance. Given that, 1) our ideas of universals are only
confused products of the imagination (dependent on the ima-
gining mind for their existence), and 2) attributes are gen-
erally thought of as universals, it would seem that to be
consistent Spinoza would have to hold that the attributes
are mind dependent. But, as I have argued, Spinoza is not
a "subjectivist" with regard to the attributes. They are,
like substance, mind independent. They would exist even if
there were no minds to perceive them. Further, Spinoza dis-
tinguishes attributes from universals by holding that the
attributes are products of the intellect, not the imagination.
It seems consistent for Spinoza to hold that ideas
of the attributes as universals which apply to a number of
things are confused products of the imagination. In thinking
44 . Spinoza, Ethics' , 112.
45- Ibid. , 79.
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of attributes as universals which apply to a number
of things we incorrectly suppose, 1) that they are proper-
ties of general aspects shared by many things; and 2) that
our ideas refer to independent qualities shared by many
things. The attributes really are properties of substance.
We can have adequate ideas of the attributes when, and only
when, we correct our mistaken assumptions of the imagina-
tion by using our intellect, which gives us a correct un-
derstanding of substance. Through the intellect we will
realize that there is only one subject of predicates (not
many subjects), and that the attributes are correctly
thought of as properties of one thing (not many things).
Hence, although we generally think of attributes as uni-
versals which apply to a number of individual things, this
makes no sense in a monistic system like Spinoza's, where
there is only one thing. As Wolfson states: "The term
' universal .carries associations which would be only
46
confusing in its use m connection with Spinoza."
46 . Wolfson, Spino~za Vol. I, 75*
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CHAPTER III
ESSENCE
I have argued in Chapter II that for Spinoza the at-
tributes of a substance are real things, and not simply sub-
jective modes of perception. In this chapter I will attempt
to discover what kind of a thing an attribute is in Spinoza's
thought. Are the attributes of a substance what one would
call properties (essential or accidental), or are they some-
thing else altogether? In order to answer this question it
is important to turn to a discussion of the notion of "essence
in Spinoza. Since Spinoza defines "attribute" as that which
constitutes the essence of a substance, it is reasonable to
assume that for Spinoza "attribute" and "essence" have, at
the very least, similar connotations (and perhaps even simi-
lar referents). In order, then, to understand Spinoza's
meaning of the term "attribute" it is necessary that one
has an understanding of the meaning of the term "essence"
in Spinoza's thinking.
To understand Spinoza's meaning of the notion of "es-
sence" it must be known if his understanding of the term
"essence" bears any resemblance to what is commonly thought
of as the meaning of that term. Does Spinoza, for example,
make any clear distinction between "essence" and "essential
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property?" Does his notion of "essence" (and hence "attri-
bute") reduce itself to what we would simply call an essen-
tial property, or does he have an understanding of the term
"essence" similar to one in use today? In order to answer
these questions I follow a distinction employed by Alvin
Plantinga in his article, "World and Essence." 1 In this
article Plantinga attempts to show the difference between
what is called an essential property and what is called an
essence or "haecceity" .
According to Plantinga, a property is an essential
property of a thing X, just in case X has it and there is
no world in which X has its complement. An essence or
"haecceity", on the other hand, is not only a property
which is essential to X, but has the further feature that
2
nothing distinct from X can have it m any world. In
otherwords, an essence, in Plantinga' s sense, has the fea-
ture of uniquely individuating whatever has it. Thus, for
Plantinga, there is a distinction between an essence and an
essential property.
In accordance with Plantinga' s distinction, I shall at-
tempt to answer the following questions: Is an essence (and
hence an attribute), for Spinoza, something that uniquely
Y~. A. Plantinga, "World and Essence," Philosophical Review ,
October 1970, 461-492.
2 . Ibid. , 474.
55
individuates whatever has it (and hence not something
shared by two or more distinct individuals), or does
Spinoza's idea of what an essence is simply reduce to
what Plantinga and I would call an essential property?
Does an attribute, for Spinoza, in constituting the essence
of substance constitute an essence in Plantinga’ s sense
(uniquely individuate that substance), or is it simply an
essential property of that substance? It is only through
an understanding of the answers to these questions that one
can comprehend what Spinoza means by the term "attribute"
.
Therefore, the crucial question to ask with regard to
Spinoza is whether an essence is something that uniquely
individuates whatever has it, or something that can be
present in two or more distinct individuals. Perhaps an
answer to this can be found by looking once again at how
Spinoza defines "essence" .
[P] I consider as belonging to the essence of
a thing that, which being given, the thing
is necessarily given also, and, which be-
ing removed, the thing is necessarily re-
moved also; in other words, that without
which the thing, and which itself without
the thing, can neither be nor be con-
ceived .3
What can be said about the above definition [P]? First, it
is important to clarify what it means in Spinoza's thought
for an essence to exist. One way of representing this is
3 . Spinoza, Ethics , 82.
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the following: Let an essence E he a sum of properties Fix
....Fn. Then E exists iff (3X) (Fix Fnx) . Now let X he
some thing, and let E he X's essence. Then [P] says that
X exists sE exists. That is, E can neither he nor be con-
ceived without X and X can neither be nor he conceived
without E. (This is, I think, the most plausible way of
filling out Spinoza's meaning in [P].) What implications
does this definition [P] have regarding the question of
whether an essence is for Spinoza an essential property or
an essence in Plantinga's sense?
[P] shows that for Spinoza an essence is at the very
least an essential property, since X can neither he nor he
conceived without E. [P] also shows that an essence for
Spinoza is something more than an essential property, since
the implication goes both ways. Not only is it the case
that X can neither he nor he conceived without E, hut E can
neither he nor be conceived without X. In general, the only
requirement for an essential property is that the thing can
neither he nor he conceived without it. So it is true that
[P] shows that an essence is something more than an essen-
tial property. I contend, however, that [P] does not in-
dicate that an essence for Spinoza uniquely individuates
the thing that has it. In order for [P] to show that an
essence uniquely individuates, a further clause would have
to he added to [P] stating that no other thing distinct
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from X can have E. In order for an essence to uniquely
individuate it must not only he true that X cannot exist
without E, and E without X, hut in addition, E cannot
exist in any other thing. Spinoza's definition of "es-
sence" as represented in [P] does not meet this require-
ment, and therefore does not present us with something
which uniquely individuates.
An objection might he raised against my interpretation
of [P]. It might he argued that [P] shows that an essence
for Spinoza uniquely individuates for the following reason:
Suppose two people, a and h, have the same essence, e_.
Also, suppose there is a world w in which a exists, hut h
does not. In such a world e is given, hut h is not given.
This violates [P]. This argument, however, does not seem
to me to he a valid objection to my claim that [P] does not
indicate that an essence, for Spinoza, uniquely individuates.
I think that Spinoza would claim that the case represented
above cannot happen according to [P] . Following [P], if a
exists in world w, then the essence of a exists in world w.
If the essence of a exists in world w, and a and b have the
same essence, then according to [P] b must also exist in
world w. In otherwords, Spinoza would claim that where a
and h have the same essence there is no world in which a
exists and h does not.
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Using 3-S an indicator of what an essence is for
Spinoza, one is inclined to say that an essence for him
is little more than what would he called an essential pro-
perty. Since an attribute is that which "constitutes the
4fs sence of substance," an attribute is basically an essen-
tial property, and not something which uniquely individuates
a substance . Other statements Spinoza makes concerning an
essence need to be examined, however, before it can be de-
termined if this is indeed his meaning.
In a crucial passage in the Ethics, where Spinoza at-
tempts to show that from an "essence" or "nature" no defi-
nite number of individuals can be deduced, he once again
appears to imply that the same essence can apply to several
different individuals and hence does not uniquely indivi-
duate . He says
:
...the definition of a triangle ex-
presses nothing beyond the actual na-
ture of a triangle : it does not imply
any fixed number of triangles .5
Spinoza goes on to imply that any number of individual tri-
angles can have the same nature or essence
.
Furthermore, in an important passage in the Ethics ,
Spinoza unequivocally implies that several individuals can
have the same essence. He states:
44 Spinoza, Ethics
,
45
•
5- Ibid. , 50.
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[Q] For example, a man is the cause of
another man's existence, but not of
his essence (for the latter is an
eternal truth), and, therefore, the
two men may be entirely similar in
essence
,
but must be different in
existence; and hence if the existence
of one of them cease
,
the existence
of the other will not necessarily
cease also; but if the essence of the
one could be destroyed, and be made
false, the essence of the other would
be destroyed also.
6
Given quotations such as [Ql, it appears that an essence for
Spinoza is what Plantinga would call an essential property.
It is something that is essential to the thing that has it,
but which can also be present in other individuals. Since
an attribute constitutes an essence, it seems as if an at-
tribute is basically an essential property also.
Unfortunately, however, this issue is not as simple to
unravel as it first appears. We have other statements by
Spinoza which seem to imply just the opposite ( i .e . , that
two or more distinct individuals cannot share the same es-
sence or nature). The most obvious example of this is in
proposition V (discussed previously), where Spinoza states,
"There cannot exist in the universe two or more substances
n
having the same nature or attribute.”' (Call this [R].)
As has been seen, Spinoza also states in the Ethics
Z~. Spinoza, Ethics
,
62
.
7- Ibid
.
,
47.
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(proposition XIV) that, "...if any substance besides God
v/ere granted, it would have to be explained by some attri-
bute of God, and thus two substances with the same attri-
bute would exist, which... is absurd..." (Call this [S].)
In quotations such as and Cs^ Spinoza seems to give a
notion of "essence" or "attribute" which corresponds to
Plantinga's, i . e .
,
uniquely individuating.
There appears to be an inconsistency between [P] and
[Q], and [R] and [S]. Spinoza states in [P] and [Q] that
an essence (or nature or attribute) can be shared by two or
more distinct individuals. Yet, he also states (in [R] and
[S]), that an essence or attribute cannot be shared by two
or more distinct individuals.
It seems that there are three possible solutions to
this apparent inconsistency in Spinoza's thought. One easy
solution to this problem is to point out that in [R] and [S]
Spinoza is talking about substances, whereas in quotations
like [Q] he is speaking about modes, not substances. (Call
this interpretation #1.) One could say that Spinoza has a
different notion of "essence" or "attribute" when it is
applied to substances than when it is applied to modes.
An essence or attribute when it applies to modes is an essen-
tial property, and hence can be shared by two or more distinct
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individuals; an essence or attribute as it applies to
O
substances uniquely individuates.
A second possible solution (call this interpretation
#11 ), is the following: It could be pointed out that in
[Q] Spinoza is definitely talking about the notion of
"essence”, whereas in [R] and [S] he is speaking about
"attribute", not "essence". The apparent inconsistency
could then be remedied by holding that "essence", for Spi-
noza, is not identical to "attribute "--that they are two
different concepts . Whereas essence is what we would call
an essential property, an attribute uniquely individuates.
A third way of solving this particular problem (call
this interpretation #111), which is equally as plausible as
both of the above, is the following: It could be said that
although Spinoza uses "attribute" and "essence" interchange-
ably, he has two different senses of these terms. This is
perhaps what Powell meant when he suggested, "It would be
a mistake to suppose that he is consistent in his use of the
word 'essence' It seems that Spinoza sometimes uses
"attribute" or "essence" in the sense of essential property,
Q~. It should be mentioned that it is not clear that Spinoza
holds that modes have attributes or essences. There is,
however, textual support that could be presented point-
ing to the fact that he does hold this. See for example,
Spinoza, Correspondenc e , 313 *
9. Powell, Spinoza and Religion , 138
.
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and sometimes he uses "attribute" or "essence" in the sense
of uniquely individuating. An attribute or essence is an
essential property whenever "attribute" or "essence" sig-
nifies an atomic attribute. In otherwords
,
whenever
"attribute" or "essence" is used in the sense of an indi-
vidual attribute or essence, it has the meaning of essen-
tial property. This sense of "attribute" or "essence" could
be represented as follows: For any entity x, if p is an
atomic attribute of x (where x ranges over both modes and
substances) then p is an essential property of x. An attri-
bute or essence is an essence of x (uniquely individuates)
whenever "attribute" or "essence" signifies the collection
of all the attributes. That is to say, whenever "attribute"
or "essence" is used in the sense of "sum" attribute, it
uniquely individuates. This sense of "attribute" or "es-
sence" could be represented as follows: For any entity x,
if s is the sum attribute of x then s is the essence of x.
The apparent inconsistency between QP H and [Q] and [R] and
[S] could then be remedied along the following lines: In
[R] and [S] Spinoza is using the term "attribute" in the
sense of sum attribute, and claiming that no two things can
share all their attributes in common. In such a case they
would have the same essence and there would be no reason to
speak of them as two. In quotations such as [Q] Spinoza is
using the notion of "attribute" or "essence" in the sense of
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an atomic attribute, and claiming that two distinct things
may share the same atomic attribute or essence ( i ,e
.
,
essen-
tial property). It is not the case that Spinoza believes
two things cannot have an attribute or essential property
in common, for indeed they can and do. What cannot happen
is that two distinct things share all their attributes in
common. On this interpretation, Spinoza does have a sense
of "essence" which corresponds to Plantinga's: That which
uniquely individuates x (or x's essence) is the collection
of all of its attributes
.
It is evident thus far that there are three possible
ways to circumvent the apparent inconsistency in quotations
[p] and [Q], and [R] and [S]. Each of these interpreta-
tions has a certain plausibility. It seems, however, that
interpretation #111 is preferable to either interpretation
#1 or interpretation #11.
Interpretations #1 and #11 would solve the inconsistency
between quotations [P] and [Q], and [R] and [S], but I do
not believe that Spinoza ever held either of these two
views. Interpretations #1 and #11 might be represented
as follows:
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//I A . essence--mode
B. attribute--mode
C. essence--substance
D. attribute--substance
essential property
essential property
essence (uniquely individuates)
essence (uniquely individuates)
#11 A . essence--mode
B. attribute--mode
C . essence--substance
D. attribute--substance
essential property
essence (uniquely individuates)
essential property
essence (uniquely individuates)
As can be seen from the above chart, both interpretations
#1 and #11 make the claim that whenever the term "essence"
in Spinoza is applied to a mode, it signifies an essential
property ( i .e . , #1 .A . and #II.A.). The falseness of this
claim is indicated by the following quotations from
Spinoza
:
A definition, if it is to be called per-
fect, must explain the inmost essence of
a thing, and must take care not to substi-
tute for this any of its properties . In
order to illustrate my meaning, without
taking an example which would seem to show
a desire to expose other people's errors,
I will choose the case of something ab-
stract, the definition of which is of lit-
tle moment. Such is a circle. If a cir-
cle be defined as a figure, such that all
straight lines drawn from the centre to
the circumference are equal, every one
can see that such a definition does not
in the least explain the essence of a
circle, but solely one of its properties.
Though, as I have said, this is of no im-
portance in the case of figures and other
abstractions, it is of great importance
in the case of physical beings and reali-
ties: for the properties of things are
not understood so long as their essences
are unknown.! 0
10. B. Spinoza, On the Improvement of the Understanding ,
trans . R. H. Elwes (New York: Dover Inc., 1955 ). 35 -
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In the above quotation Spinoza is talking about a mode ( i .e
.
,
a circle), and claiming that we must not confuse the proper-
ties of things with their essences. Interpretation #1 and
#11, therefore, which claim that whenever the term ’'essence"
is applied to a mode the meaning is that of essential pro-
perty
,
are mistaken. The above is a case where the term
"essence” is applied to a mode and no property whatsoever
is signified. Spinoza clearly states that it would be a
mistake to think of an essence here as a property of any
kind. It seems much more likely that Spinoza has in mind
here a notion of "essence" which corresponds to Plantinga's
use of the term ( i .e . , something which uniquely individuates).
Spinoza asserts a very similar thought in the follow-
ing passage, when in talking about different modes of per-
ception he states:
Perception arising when the essence of
one thing is inferred from another thing,
but not adequately; this comes when from
some effect we gather its cause, or when
it is inferred from some general proposi-
tion that some property is always present
.... In the second case something is as-
cribed to the cause because of the effect,
as we shall show in an example, but only
a property, never the essence.
H
Spinoza goes on to use as his examples, the mind and the
body. Once again Spinoza distinguishes, in the case of modes,
a property from an essence
.
11. Spinoza, Improvement of Understanding , 8.
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There are two further quotations I would like to pre-
sent which provide evidence against interpretations #1 and
#11 :
The affect of one person differs from
the corresponding affect of another as
much as the essence of the one person
differs from that of the other .. .desire
is the very nature or essence of a per-
son... and therefore the desire of one
person differs from the desire of another
as much as the nature or essence of the
one differs from that of the other . .
.
joy and sorrow are desire or appetite
in so far as the latter is increased,
diminished, helped, or limited by exter-
nal causes; that is to say... they are the
nature itself of each person. 12
. . .the difference between the essence of
one thing and the essence of another thing
is the same as that which exists between
the reality or existence of one thing and
the reality or existence of another...
[Spinoza goes on to use as an example here,
the person Adam.]13
In both of these quotations Spinoza appears to give a mean-
ing to the notion of "essence" which corresponds to that
which Plantinga means by something which uniquely indivi-
duates whatever has it. In the first quotation Spinoza
makes desire equivalent to the essence or nature of man.
He further states that as the desire of one person differs
from that of another, so too the essence of the one must
12 . B. Spinoza, Ethics , ed. John Wild (New York: Charles
Scribner's Sons, 193°)* 262.
13. Spinoza, Improvement of Understanding , 19*
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differ from that of the other. This suggests a real dif-
ference in essence between individuals. In the second
quotation Spinoza says that the difference between the es-
sence of Adam and the essence of man in general is the same
as the difference between the existence of Adam and the
existence of man in general. Since presumably the existence
of each individual is unique, it seems that Spinoza is
equating an essence here with something that uniquely in-
dividuates. Hence, at least in these particular quotations
which have modes as their referents, one is led to believe
that "essence" means that which uniquely individuates.
Given the above quotations the claim made by both
interpretations #1 and #11, that whenever the term "essence"
is applied to a mode it signifies an essential property
(#1 .A . and #11 .A . ) , is false .
A further passage from the Correspondence shows the
falseness of the claim in interpretation #11 that "essence"
when applied to a substance always signifies an essential
property ( i .e . , #II.C.)s
. . .in the universe there cannot exist
two substances without their differ-
ing utterly in essence...
^
Here the notion of "essence" is applied to substances, and
the meaning is that of uniquely individuating.
14 . Spinoza, Correspondence , 277-
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Interpretations #1 and #11, therefore, must be rejected,
since neither is true of Spinoza. Interpretation #111, on
the other hand, does not have these difficulties. One dis-
tinct advantage is that it not only solves the aforementioned
inconsistency in Spinoza, but is also not disproved or in-
validated by anything Spinoza has written. Interpretation
#111 has another distinct advantage in that it renders Spino-
za consistent with regard to the problem raised by Simon De
Vries. If either interpretation #1 or #11 is attributed to
Spinoza, he is rendered inconsistent according to the problem
raised by De Vries. (This will be discussed in a chapter
which follows.)
To recapitulate, the question as posed at the beginning
of this chapter can now be answered: Are the attributes of
substance what one would call properties, or are they some-
thing else altogether?
H. A. Wolfson has stated that the attributes, for
Spinoza, are "...what the mediaevals called essential attri-
butes, that is to say, attributes which constitute the es-
sence."
1
^ A. Donagan has claimed that Spinoza followed
Descartes, even in his early draft of the Ethics , in his
use of the word "attribute" as "a synonym for what Descartes
had called 'principal attribute ' —the one principal property
15. Wolfson, Spinoza Vol. I, 145
•
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of each substance which constitutes its essence ." 15
Many have disagreed with this way of interpreting Spinoza,
opposing the designation of an attribute as a property of a
substance. Hallett states, for example, that,
The term "attribute" indicates clearly
enough that it is not to be taken in the
vulgar sense of a characteristic or quali-
ty related to a substance as, for example,
redness to a rose... The Attributes are
neither qualities or characteristics of
substance— The Attribute is the substance
under the determining scrutiny of the in-
tellect . 1 ?
Curley states, "...the attributes do not exist in anything
other than themselves..." 1 ^
It is my view that Wolfson and Donagan are, in this
regard, essentially correct, while Curley and Hallett are
mistaken. Spinoza used the word "attribute" to denote the
essential properties of a substance. These essential pro-
perties are things which constitute or make up the essence
of substance. The word "attribute" itself suggests a pro-
perty or predicate--something which is attributed to some-
thing else. Each attribute refers, however, to only that
property of a substance which constitutes its essence.
There is in Spinoza's writings textual support for the view
±Z~. A . Donagan , "Essence and the Distinction of Attributes
in Spinoza's Metaphysics," in Spinoza , M. Grene , ed., 165 •
17. H. F. Hallett, Benedict De Spinoza; The Elements of his
Philosophy (London: Athlone, 1957 )» 16 .
18. E. M. Curley, Spinoza's Metaphysics: An Essay in Inter-
pretation ( Cambridge: Harvard University, 1969). 18
•
70
that an attribute is a property. In the Ethics Spinoza
uses the terms "attribute" and "property" interchangeably,
stating, "...[the intellect] infers more properties in pro-
portion as the definition of the thing expresses more re-
19
ality..." ' Compare this quotation with Spinoza's state-
ment, "The more reality or being a thing has the greater the
20
number of its attributes." This indicates that the attri-
butes are really properties, and since they constitute the
essence of substance they are essential, not non-essential,
properties .
What, then, is the essence of substance, and what is
its connection with the attributes? The answer to this has
already been given. The essence of substance is the collec-
tion of the infinite attributes, and each attribute goes
into constituting that essence . Each individual attribute
is a part of the essence of substance . The collection of
the attributes is the essence of substance. Hence, Spinoza
did follow Descartes in his usage of the term "attribute".
He, too, used the term "attribute" to connote the one prin-
cipal property of each substance which constitutes its
essence .
19 . Spinoza, Ethics , 5 9*
20. Ibid., 50.
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CHAPTER IV
SUBSTANCE
Through much of the history of philosophy prior to
Spinoza, it was traditionally assumed that along with the
infinite substance or God there also existed a number of
finite substances. These finite substances were seen to
depend in some way on the infinite substance God. Given
this dependence their proper substantial character, ac-
cording to the traditional definition of "substance" as
the independently existent, became a dubious assumption.
Although Descartes had recognized this problem and reduced
the many substances to two main kinds (and even disposed
of these by admitting that the only substance which clearly
meets the definition of "substance" is God), no one before
Spinoza had definitely and decisively drawn the conclusion
that there could be, and was, only one substance in the
universe
.
H. A. Wolfson has traced the definition of "substance"
from the time of Aristotle, through the medievals, to the
time of Descartes and Spinoza.
1
In this work Wolfson shows
similarities among definitions which cannot be ignored.
1. Wolfson, Spinoza Vol. I, 61-78.
72
Aristotle begins his metaphysical investigations by
dividing all Being into substance and accidents
• He gives
at least six different definitions of "substance”. Cer-
tain of these definitions are very important to an under-
standing of later philosophers such as Descartes and Spino-
za. One such definition is the following: "Some things
can exist apart and some cannot, and it is the former that
2
are substances." This criterion of a substance points
to the notion of "independent existence". A substance,
according to Aristotle, can exist on its own--it can exist
apart from other things. Qualities and relations, on the
other hand, exist only as the qualities or relations of
substances
.
The idea that substances can exist apart from, or in-
dependent of, their qualities is challenged by critics of
Aristotle. Though some philosophers ( i . e . , Platonists)
hold that qualities can exist without a substance, few
hold that a substance can exist without qualities . Aris-
3totle does not seem to deal with this problem. As will
become evident, a very similar problem exists in Spinoza.
2. Aristotle, Metaphysics , XII, 5. 1070b, 36-1071a, I»
in Introduction to Aristotle , ed. Richard McKeon
(New York: Modern Library, 19^7), 279-
3 . I have taken much of my information on Aristotle and
Descartes from D. J. O'Connor, "Substance and Attribute,"
in Encyclopedia of Philosophy , Vol. 8 (New York: Mac-
millajTrT^^TTT^^WT-
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Another criterion of a substance for Aristotle is
that which is a substratum. A substance is a substratum
which underlies and supports its qualities, "...while re-
maining numerically one and the same .
. Both the idea
that substance is a substratum, and the idea that a sub-
stance is capable of independent existence, are later de-
veloped by Descartes and Spinoza.
Wolfson points out that early medievals begin their
metaphysical investigations not with the phrase that all
Being is divided into substance and accidents (like Aris-
totle), but rather with the statement that all Being is
divided into that which dwells within a dwelling and that
which does not dwell within a dwelling. This phraseology
is later refined to read that all Being is divided into
that which is in itself and that which is in a subject.
The former is called "substance", the latter is called
"accident"
Descartes claims that a substance can exist indepen-
dently in the following quotation:
By substance, we understand nothing else
than a thing which so exists that it needs
no other thing in order to exist. And in
fact only one single substance can be un-
derstood which clearly needs nothing else,
W~. Aristotle, Categories , in Basic Works of Aristotle ,
ed . Richard McKeon (New York: Random House, 1941 ), 13
•
5- Wolfson, Spinoza Vol. I, 62.
?4
namely God... That is why the word
substance does not pertain univoce to
God and to other things, as they say in
the schools, that is, no common signifi-
cation for this appellation which will
apply equally to God and to them can be
distinctly understood.
6
He further states, "Really the notion of substance
is just this--that which can exist by itself, without the
aid of any other substance."'
In the first quotation Descartes claims that a sub-
stance is a thing which does not depend upon any other
thing for its existence. He does not clarify what he
means by "any other thing." He goes on to state that God
is the only being to whom the term "substance" is properly
applied (although he continues to apply the term "substance"
to finite created things).
In the second quotation Descartes specifies what he
means by "any other thing." He means "any other substance."
This second definition, of course, is unsatisfactory, since
it is circular. We can still ask of this definition: What
is a substance? As we shall see, a similar problem arises
in an interpretation of Spinoza's definition of "substance".
Ren£ Descartes. Philosophical Works of Descartes , Vol. I,
trans . F. S. Haldane (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1934), 239-240.
7. Rene Descartes, Philosophical Works , Vol. II, 2nd Ed.,
trans. Haldane & Ross (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1931), 101. Cited in O'Connor, Encyclopedia
of Philosophy
,
Vol. 8
,
38 -
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According to Descartes, substances are not only
things which can exist independently, hut they are also
the subjects in which properties inhere:
Everything in which anything is immedi-
ately contained, as in a subject, or
through which anything we perceive ex-
ists— that is, any property, or quality,
or attribute of which we have in our- o
selves a real idea--is called substance .
In this definition, a substance is the subject of properties
or attributes. This is reminiscent of Aristotle, where a
substance is a substratum in which properties inhere
.
In Spinoza's definitions of "substance" and "mode"
there are elements of Aristotle, the medievals and Des-
cartes. Spinoza's formal definition of "substance" appears
in definition III, Part I of the Ethics
,
and reads:
By substance, I mean that which is in it-
self, and is conceived through itself; in
other words, that of which a conception
can be formed independently of any other
conception .9
Spinoza's formal definition of "mode" appears in definition
V, Part I of the Ethics, and reads:
By mode, I mean the modifications of sub-
stance, or that which exists in, and is
conceived through, something other than
itself .I®
8. B. Spinoza, "Principles of the Philosophy of Descartes,"
in Earlier Philosophical Writings , trans . Frank A. Hayes
(New York: Bobbs-Merrill , 1963), 22
.
9. Spinoza, Ethics , 45 -
10. Ibid.
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Wolfson points out that Spinoza, follows the mgdievals in
calling that thing which is in itself (or does not dwell
within a dwelling) "substance". He departs from the medie-
vals, however, by replacing the term "accident" with the
term "mode". Wolfson shows that Spinoza's use of the term
"mode" instead of "accident" can be traced to Descartes.
Descartes uses the term "accident" as synonymous with
"mode", and the opposite of "substance". Spinoza himself
ascribes his division of Being into substance and mode to
Descartes. 11 Also, in Spinoza's earlier writings he uses
1 pthe term "accident" instead of the term "mode".
An accident or mode for Spinoza is distinguished
from a substance in the following way: A mode cannot exist
without the substance or subject of which it is a mode. A
substance exists in itself and not in any other subject.
Spinoza insists upon the strict application of the tradi-
tional definition of "substance" . Nothing which exists
in something else in any sense or manner can be called
"substance". As Wolfson states,
Note that he does not reject the generally
accepted definition of substance; on the
contrary, he insists upon its rigid appli-
cation. Only that which is really and ab-
solutely in itself can be called substance,
11 . B. Spinoza, " Thoughts on Metaphysics," in Earlier
Philosophical Writings , 135-136.
12. See references in Wolfson, Spinoza Vol. I, 66.
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and so only that which is called the
Necessary of Existence or God can be
truly called substance. All the other
things which belong to the so-called
possible of existence are not substance;
they are what the Medievals would have
called accidents, but which Spinoza pre-
fers to call by a new name, modes... 13
Wolfson's interpretation is supported by Spinoza when in
a dialogue in the Short Treatise he states:
What you say, 0 Desire, that there are
different substances, that, I tell you
is false; for I see clearly that there
is but One, which exists through itself,
and is a support to all other attributes
.
And if you will refer to the material and
mental as substances, in relation to the
modes which are dependent on them, why
then, you must also call them modes in
relation to the substances on which
they depend; for they are not conceived
by you as existing through themselves .1^
Hence the first part of Spinoza's definition of "sub-
stance" follows the tradition of Aristotle, the medievals
and Descartes. The only apparent change is that Spinoza
insists upon the strict application of that definition.
Spinoza thinks of a substance as capable of independent
existence . He says in his letter to Christian Juyghens
that if you ask, "...whether there be only a single Being
who subsists by his own sufficiency or force? I not only
affirm this to be so, but also undertake to prove it..."
1^
13- Wolfson, Spinoza Vol. I, 71.
14 . Spinoza, Short Treatise , 6l
.
15. Spinoza, Correspondence , 353 -
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It is "in itself" and needs no other thing in order to
exist. The first part of Spinoza's definition of "sub-
stance" encounters difficulties similar to those mentioned
regarding the definitions of Aristotle and Descartes. One
can ask of Spinoza, as critics have asked of Aristotle,
if it is possible for a substance to exist without attri-
butes. If the answer is no, then is it true that a sub-
stance can exist independently? It is much more question-
able to assert the existence of a substance without attri-
butes, than to assert the existence of attributes without
a substance
.
Suppose, however, that when Spinoza claims a substance
is in itself he does not mean that it exists without any
attributes, but rather that it does not depend upon those
attributes for its existence . It can cause and sustain
itself without any help from its attributes. This is also
problematic . The attributes constitute the essence of sub-
stance, and the essence of a thing is that, "without which
the thing can neither be nor be conceived." (See Chapter
III.) Hence, it seems that a substance does depend upon
its attributes for its existence. As such Spinoza cannot
claim that by "in itself" he means that a substance does
not depend upon anything else, including its attributes,
for its existence .
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Perhaps Spinoza means that a substance with its
attributes is what is capable of independent existence.
The definition of "substance" then reads: x is a substance =
df . x is a thing which with its attributes is capable of
existing independently of any other y (where y is / x).
Then, however, the question must be asked (as it was
asked of Descartes): What is it that the variable y ranges
over? In otherwords
,
what is the "any other y" that a sub-
stance with its attributes is independent of? If the an-
swer is other substances with their attributes, then it
seems that Spinoza's definition of "substance" is, although
not strictly circular, uninformative. If we do not have
some prior concept of substance we will not be able to
pick out the domain to which these other substances with
their attributes refer. If "any other y" does not refer
to other substances with their attributes, then he must tell
us what "any other y" refers to . It seems that what Spino-
za offers as a definition of "substance" is more properly
thought of as a statement which contains primitives that
are supposed to be self-evident. Defining "substance" as
that which is independent of any other y where y ranges
over other substances still leaves us puzzled about the
question: What is a substance? Further, Spinoza defines
"attribute" as that which constitutes the essence of substance .
This definition, together with the above proposed definition
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of "substance" leads to circularity. One cannot define
"substance" with reference to "attribute" without circu-
larity .
In the second part of Spinoza's definition of "sub-
stance" he departs from the traditional definition, making
an epistemological claim. He claims not only that a sub-
stance is "in itself," but that it does not presuppose any
other conception in order to be itself conceived. Hence,
part of what it means to say x is a substance, is to say
that x is a thing that does not require the conception of
any other thing. Again it must be asked: What is "any
other thing" here? If we suppose that "any other thing"
is any other substance, then to say x is a substance implies
x is a thing that does not require the conception of any
other substance. This makes Spinoza's definition circular.
If this part of the definition is rewritten so that "thing"
in "any other thing" is construed to be a variable, as is
done in the first part of the definition of "substance",
that is, (x) (y ) (x is a substance & x / y ^ the conception
of x does not require the conception of y), the implication
seems to be false. It appears to be false (as will be evi-
dent in Chapter VI when the Leibniz problem is discussed),
since it seems that the concept of the attributes is neces-
sary for the concept of substance. Hence, Spinoza's defi-
nition of "substance" seems to be either circular, false,
or uninformative .
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Thus far it has been shown "that; pant; of Spinoza's
definition of "substance" is in the tradition of Aristotle
and Descartes. When Spinoza says that a substance is "in
itself" he is claiming, along with his two predecessors,
that a substance can exist independently. I believe, as
Joachim does, that Spinoza also followed Descartes and
Aristotle in holding that a substance is the subject of
properties. As Joachim states in speaking of Spinoza,
"
. . .the antithesis of Substance and its states or modifi-
cations is a more precise formulation of the popular an-
tithesis of thing and properties." 1^ According to Spinoza,
"Everything which exists, exists either in itself or in
17
something else." A substance, as we have seen, is
what exists in itself. Everything else ( i .e . , modes and
attributes), for Spinoza, exists in substance. In other-
words, Spinoza holds a substratum theory. A substance is
a substratum in which a variety of properties inhere, and
which supports all the qualities inhering in it. There
are essential properties, or attributes, and there are
non-essential properties, or modes. The substance itself
is something distinct from the sum of its attributes.
16 . H. H. Joachim, A Study of the Ethics of Spinoza
(New York: Russell & Russell, 1^6^ ) , 15
•
17. Spinoza, Ethics , 46.
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When I claim that Spinoza held a substratum view of
substance I am not referring to the theory (sometimes
called the "substratum theory") where substance is a so-
called "bare particular" . This is correctly the view of
some "subjectivists" considered in Chapter II. The mean-
ing of "substratum" I have in mind is the one put forth
by such scholars as Morris Lazerowitz in his article,
"Substratum" . Lazerowitz offers the following three
characteristics of the "substratum" view:
(1) A substance is a thing in which a
variety of properties inhere, or
which support them or is their
bearer
.
(2) The substance itself is held to
be something distinct from the sum
of its properties.
(3) Our experience of the substratum
or substance is confined to its
qualities . What the substance or
substratum itself is remains
hidden .18
This use of "substratum" takes its meaning from the
original Latin word for substance (that is, from " substo "
,
which means "I stand under, I support"). I am attributing
to Spinoza a modified version of the "substratum" view
presented above. I am claiming that for Spinoza, a
substance is a thing in which a variety of properties
18. M. Lazerowitz, "Substratum", in Classical and Con-
temporary Metaphysics , ed. R. De George (New York:
Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1962), 157-
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inhere, as (1) previously stated, and which is distinct
from the sum of those properties (2). Spinoza departs
from the traditional "substratum” view in that he does not
hold the third criterion. For Spinoza, the experience we
have of the properties of substance does provide us with
knowledge of the substance itself. Unlike Locke, substance
is not an "I know not what" which supports qualities. When
our intellect perceives the essence of substance ( i .e . , the
attributes), substance is truly perceived. Hence our per-
ception of the attributes of substance does provide us
with knowledge of substance .
Other scholars, such as Curley and Pollock, disagree.
They believe that Spinoza holds what is called a "bundle"
view of substance . According to their interpretation of
Spinoza, a substance is nothing more than the bundle of its
properties. Pollock makes this claim in the following
statement
:
If we think of Spinoza's Substance as
distinct from and underlying the attri-
butes... we shall certainly go wrong...
Substance consists of the attributes
-jq
and has no reality other than theirs. y
Curley expresses this same thought when he says, "Substance
20
simply is the sum of its attributes." Their claim is
F. Pollock. Spinoza : His Life and Philosophy (London:
Duckworth, 1899 ) > 152
•
20 . Curley, Spinoza's Metaphysics , 91-
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based on a misconception regarding the nature of substance
and its attributes, which shall be discussed in Chapter VI.
In addition to the characterization of "substance"
quoted above, Spinoza makes other statements regarding
the nature of a substance. Curley addresses himself to
these additional statements and errs here as well. For
example, he claims that Spinoza does not define a sub-
stance as a being whose essence involves existence, but
rather as a being that has no external cause. 21 Curley
thinks it follows from this definition of a substance,
by the principle of sufficient reason, that a substance
is also a being whose essence involves existence, but
that this is not part of its definition. Surely he is
wrong. Spinoza defines a substance as a being whose es-
sence involves existence. He says, "...as it has been
shown already that existence appertains to the nature of
substance, existence must necessarily be included in its
definition . . . " 22
Further, Curley disagrees with the majority of inter-
preters of Spinoza that the cause of its own exitence
( i .e . , substance) is the whole of nature. Curley thinks,
rather, that what "substance" denotes is not the whole of
21 . Curley, Spinoza's Metaphysics , 40
.
22. Spinoza, Ethics
,
50*
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nature but only its active part— its primary elements.
His main support for this claim comes from the Short
Treatise
,
where Spinoza speaks of dividing the whole of
nature into Natura Naturans (God) and Natura Naturata
(the modes of God). Once again Curley is mistaken.
As Williamson correctly points out, Natura Naturans and
Natura Naturata do not represent a division of the whole
of nature, but rather are two different ways of looking
24
at the whole of nature
.
I think there can be little doubt that Spinoza did
indeed view substance as encompassing the whole of nature.
Conclusive evidence for this comes in proposition XV of
the Ethics
,
where Spinoza states: "Whatever is, is in
25God, and without God nothing can be, or be conceived."
How can we understand this quotation except as saying that
everything, including the modes, is in substance such that
substance includes within itself the whole of nature . One
of the chief purposes of Spinoza's doctrine of God is to
avoid the mistake of having a sharp demarcation between
the infinite God and the finite world. For this very rea-
son Spinoza makes extension an attribute of God. He tries
23 . Spinoza, Short~Treatise , 80
.
24. R. K. Williamson, "On Curley's Interpretation of Spino-
za," Australasian Journal of Philosophy , Vol. 51* No. 2,
Aug. 1973, 160.
25- Spinoza, Ethics , 55*
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to avoid philosophic dualism which presents an imma-
terial God over a material world. Hence he does identi-
fy God with the whole of nature and not simply its ac-
tive part
.
Williamson sees Curley's failure as his inability
to correctly bring out the distinction between nature
seen as active and nature seen as passive. I think,
however, that Curley's problem lies in his belief that
? 6for Spinoza a substance cannot be composed of parts.
Believing so, Curley is unwilling to attribute to Spinoza
a doctrine that asserts the existence of at least two
parts to a substance, an active and a passive. But,
Spinoza was not against the existence of parts in a sub-
stance . He was against parts in a substance which are
separable. He believed that in actuality the parts of
a substance are inseparable from the substance , even
though we can distinguish them in thought. Substance can
be conceived as having parts as long as those parts are
viewed as homogeneous. As Spinoza says, " . . . [We may]
conceive the whole of nature as one individual, whose
parts, that is, all bodies, vary in infinite ways with-
27
out any change in the individual as a whole."
2Z~. Curley. Spinoza's Metaphysics , 163
.
27 . Spinoza, Ethics , 96 .
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In summary, Spinoza followed a long line of think-
ers from Aristotle to Descartes in conceiving of a sub-
stance as an independent being. He departed from those
thinkers when he defined a substance as something con-
ceived through itself alone. Both of these definitions
have been shown to be problematic. A substance, for him,
is a substratum in which qualities inhere and it encom-
passes the whole of nature
. Given substance encompasses
the whole of nature, there is only one substance in the
universe, and that substance is God.
CHAPTER V
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SUBSTANCE AND ATTRIBUTES
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Statement of the De Vries Problem
The most devastating objection ever raised against
Spinoza's thesis that there is only one substance in the
universe is that raised by Spinoza's contemporary Simon
De Vries
.
De Vries, in an important letter to Spinoza, quotes
a statement by Spinoza which reads:
...hence it is plain that, although two
attributes really distinct be conceived,
that is, one without the aid of the
other, we cannot therefore infer, that
they constitute two entities or two dif-
ferent substances. For it belongs to
the nature of substance
,
that each of its
attributes should be conceived through it-
self, though all the attributes it pos-
sesses exist simultaneously in it.l
As can be seen in this letter, Spinoza plainly states that
the diversity of the attributes does not conflict with his
belief that there is only one substance . De Vries is puz-
zled by this statement, and protests:
Here our master seems to assume, that
the nature of substance is so consti-
tuted, that it may have several attri-
butes . But this doctrine has not yet
been proved, unless you refer to the
sixth definition, of absolutely infinite
1. Spinoza, Correspondence
,
312.
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substance or God. Otherwise, if it be
asserted that each substance has only
one attribute
,
and I have two ideas of
two attributes, I may rightly infer
that, where there are two different
attributes, there are also different
substances .2
The important question De Vries raises can be repre-
sented in two different ways. One way of representing it
is the following: [l] Spinoza says that there is only one
substance (proposition XIV ) , and that substance is simple
and indivisible. He also says that substance (or God) is
identical to its essence. ("The existence of God and his
o
essence are one and the same ."J ) Spinoza further states
that the attributes constitute the essence of substance,
and that these attributes are infinite and distinct from
one another. Since the attributes constitute the essence
of substance and there are an infinite number of attributes,
one infers that substance has an infinite number of distinct
essences. Yet, if substance has an infinite number of dis-
tinct essences and substance is identical to its essence,
how can there be only one substance?
A second way of representing the problem raised by
De Vries (which is similar to the first), is the following:
[2] Spinoza says there is only one substance, and that sub-
stance is identical to its essence. The implication is
2 ~. Spinoza, Correspondence , 312
.
3 . Spinoza, Ethics , 63 *
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that there is only one essence of substance. But Spinoza
also states the attributes constitute the essence of sub-
stance, and these attributes are infinite and distinct
from one another. The implication is that substance has
an infinite number of distinct essences. This obviously
is inconsistent with the claim that substance has only
one essence .
Although both [l] and [2] emanate from De Vries' cri-
ticism of Spinoza, De Vries specifically addresses problem
[l] when he states: "...where there are two different
4
attributes, there are also different substances."
In response to De Vries' criticism Spinoza replies:
. . .by substance I mean that, which is in
itself and is conceived through itself;
that is, of which the conception does not
involve the conception of anything else
.
By attribute I mean the same thing, ex-
cept that it is called attribute with re-
spect to the understanding, which attri-
butes to substance the particular nature
aforesaid. This definition, I repeat,
explains with sufficient clearness what
I wish to signify by substance or attri-
bute . You desire, though there is no
need, that I should illustrate by an ex-
ample
,
how one and the same thing can be
stamped with two names . In order not to
seem miserly, I will give you two .-5
Spinoza goes on to give as his example the names of Jacob
43 Spinoza. Correspondence , 312
.
5. Ibid. , 315-316.
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and Israel in order to illustrate his point that the same
thing can have two different names
.
The curious part of Spinoza's reply to De Vries (as
/•
Alan Donagan correctly points out ), is that it completely
misses the point of De Vries' question. Spinoza is asked
by De Vries for a clearer explanation of how one and the
same substance can have more than one attribute . Spinoza
is asked to show why the multiplicity of the attributes
does not jeopardize the oneness of substance. All Spinoza
does in his reply is reiterate once again his definitions
of substance and attribute, and show how one and the same
thing can be designated by two names. De Vries, however,
does not indicate any difficulty in understanding how one
and the same thing can have different names. Further,
since in both of Spinoza's examples of different names for
the same thing he designates modes not attributes, he doubly
avoids answering De Vries' protest.
The majority of Spinoza scholars have considered De
Vries' objection an insoluble problem. Joachim, for example,
has stated:
We must therefore admit that there is a
serious defect in Spinoza's general theory
of the nature of Reality. The unity of
Substance which seemed so absolute--the
unity which was more than the unity of a
A . Donagan
,
"Essence and the Distinction of Attributes,"
in Spinoza
,
M. Grene
,
ed
.
,
168
.
92
sys tem--resolves itself into a mere
"togetherness" of an infinite mul-
tiplicity. The Reality falls apart
into a substratum without charac-
ter ... 7
J. Martineau, in agreement with Joachim states:
How that essence can be one and self-
identical, while its constituents are
many, heterogeneous and unrelated, is
a question which is hopeless of solu-
tion. If they have nothing in common
with one another, how can the essences
which they express help being differ-
ent? And if the essence is the same
,
how can they be aliens in nature. ?°
I intend to show that this is not an insoluble problem.
Statement of the Leibniz Problem
As seen in Chapter IV, Spinoza defines a substance as
that which is in itself and conceived through itself. Spi-
noza further explains that to be conceived through itself
means to be in need of the conception of no other thing in
order for itself to be conceived. In Chapters II and III
it is shown that the attributes are related to substance
in the sense that they are the things out of which the es-
sence of substance is composed.
These two definitions bring forth a second problem
that Spinoza scholars have had to reconcile—the Leibniz
problem. Leibniz holds that Spinoza's definition of a
f. Joachim, A Study , 104.
8. Martineau, A Study of Spinoza , 185*
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substance involves an inconsistency with his definition of
an attribute. Leibniz states this objection in the follow-
ing:
[Spinoza says in his definition of an
attribute that] an attribute is per-
ceived by the intellect as constituting
the essence of substance. Therefore,
the concept of the attribute is neces-
sary to form the concept of substance
.
If you say that an attribute is not a
thing and that you really require only
that a substance does not need the con-
cept of any other thing, I answer that
you must explain what may be called a
thing, so that we may understand the
definition and understand in what way
an attribute is not a thing.
9
The objection Leibniz raises can be represented in
the following way: Spinoza defines a substance as a thing
that does not need the conception of any other thing in
order to be conceived. He also states that the attributes
"constitute the essence of substance ." 10 Since we cannot
conceive anything without conceiving its essence, we can-
not conceive a substance without conceiving its attributes.
But, if the conception of an attribute is needed in order
to conceive a substance, how can Spinoza claim that a sub-
stance is conceived through itself alone?
I intend to investigate the possibility of resolving
the Leibniz and De Vries problems.
9 . G. W. Leibniz, as quoted in Curley, Spinoza's Metaphy-
sics
,
16 .
10 . Spinoza, Ethics , 45-
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Curley's Thesis
Although not mentioned in Curley's book, Spinoza's
Metaphysics
,
his thesis is strikingly similar to the the-
sis arrived at by Joseph Ratner in his book Spinoza on God
(New York: Henry Holt, 1930). The thesis is: substance
and its attributes are one and the same thing. Curley
asks precisely v/hat Spinoza means when he states that a
substance is in itself and conceived through itself. Cur-
ley contends that the majority of Spinoza scholars are mis-
taken in their interpretation of Spinoza's definitions.
He then proceeds to show how he understands those defini-
tions .
Curley claims that most Spinoza scholars, thinking
Spinoza "a great Cartesian," suppose that he uses the terms
"substance" and "attribute" in a way similar to Descartes.
According to Curley, "...this view, for all its initial
plausibility, is a mistake."'*'''' Whereas Descartes thinks
of a substance as something different from its attributes,
"Spinoza, unlike Descartes, does identify substance with
12its attributes."
It is important to clarify what Curley means when he
says that substance is identical to "its" attributes, or
11. Curley, Spinoza's Metaphysics , 14
.
12. Ibid
.
,
16
.
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rather with the "totality" of its attributes. This is not
an easy task, however, since Curley never explains his
meaning
.
Initially, it appears that Curley is suggesting that
substance, for Spinoza, is identical with each of its in-
finite attributes. He states, for example, that "It is
not that an attribute is not a thing, but that it is not
another thing. J (That is, not different from substance.)
It seems obvious, however, that it would be a mistake for
Curley to hold this, for given the attributes are distinct
for Spinoza this interpretation results in a contradiction.
Let, for example, x stand for substance and y and z for
attributes. The following then results: (x) (Sx^ (3z)
(3y ) (Az .Ay .z/y .y=x . z = x ) ) . But, by the substitutivity of
identicals, z=y. Curley could, of course, avoid the above
contradiction by claiming that no two attributes are really
distinct for Spinoza. This does not work, however, since
as is seen in Chapter III, Spinoza explicitly claims that
the attributes are infinite and distinct from one another.
Curley apparently recognizes this problem. He cor-
rects his statement from, "substance is identical to its
attributes," to "substance is identical with the totality
IJT Curley, Spinoza’s Metaphysics , 16 . (Underlining mine .
)
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14
of its attributes." Later he says that substance is
identical to the "sum" of its attributes: "For substance
simply is the sum of its attributes." 1 ^ Now, it seems,
Curley is thinking of the attributes as constituting some
kind of whole. He appears to mean by "totality" that
which he means by "sum". But what exactly is the meaning
of "totality" or "sum" in this context? Does it mean that
substance is identical with the set or class of all the
attributes--that
,
therefore, substance is some kind of
set? Curley makes statements in his book which would lead
one to believe that he does take words such as "totality"
to designate sets. For example, at one point he says
that, "...general propositions .. .attribute a property or
a relation to all or some members of some class of indi-
vidual objects." 1 ^ If this is what Curley means by "to-
tality", then he is mistaken in attributing this view to
Spinoza. With this view, a substance becomes some kind
of abstract entity, which Spinoza obviously does not hold.
With respect to the existence of substance, Spinoza is
operating within a realist tradition. He appears to regard
the concept of "substance" as an Aristotelian would
—
14 . Curley, Spinoza’s Metaphysics , 91
•
15 . Ibid.
16 . Ibid., 50. (Underlining mine.)
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that is, as an idea which refers to a particular concrete
thing or individual existing in reality. Since Spinoza
handles the problem of universals by attributing our general
ideas to operations of the imagination which do not refer
to general abstract entities existing in reality (as
shown in Chapter II), there is no reason to suppose he
would be happy with a view of substance which makes it
an abstract entity.
Since "totality" cannot signify some kind of set,
what does it signify? Perhaps we can arrive at Curley's
meaning by thinking of his view as something like that
which I have called interpretation #111 in Chapter III.
That Is, we could think of Curley's claim that substance
is identical to the "sum" of its attributes as a claim
which states that substance is identical to the collec-
tion or bundle of its properties. On this view one is
not thinking of substance as some kind of abstract enti-
ty, but simply as the bundle of all of its attributes.
The bundle itself is not something over and above the sum
of its parts. The major difference then between Curley's
claim and mine (in Chapter III) is that Curley claims
that the collection or bundle of the attributes is the
substance, whereas I claim that the collection of the
attributes is simply the essence of substance, that which
uniquely individuates the substance, not the substance
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itself. Substance is something more than the "sum" or
bundle of its essential properties.
In interpretation #111 I argue that substance is com-
posed of essential and accidental properties. Each attri-
bute is an essential property of a substance, whereas the
totality of the attributes is the essence of substance.
A mode is an accidental property of substance
. If the
above is Curley’s claim, then he argues that the bundle
of the attributes is the substance, for, an attribute is
not "another thing" different from the substance . A puz-
zle resulting from this interpretation of Curley's claim
is that the attributes are not only infinite for Spinoza,
but only two are known, namely, extension and thought.
Substance, however, is known to all. If substance is iden-
tical to its attributes, why are those infinite attributes
unknown?
Further, I am puzzled as to why Curley claims that
substance is identical to "its" attributes. What does
"its" mean here? Usually we would fill out the meaning
of "its" as expressing the thought that substance is iden-
tical to the totality of attributes that it has. This
points to some kind of substratum view such as the one
discussed in Chapter IV. On this view substance is in
some sense a haver of qualities. But, the substratum
view is exactly the view Curley is anxious to refute by
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positing the identity of substance with "its" attributes.
Curley states:
Neither his modes nor his attributes
can exist in substance as in a sub-
ject, they do not inhere in substance.
For the attributes do not exist in any-
thing other than themselves, and the
modes are themselves the sort of thing
that would properly be the subject of
predication .17
Since the use of the word "its" here is misleading because
it suggests a substratum view, it would have been better
had Curley simply stated that substance is identical to
the attributes
.
In conclusion, it is not clear what Curley's thesis
about the identity of substance with "its" attributes is
meant to convey. And, obviously, the correctness of Cur-
ley's thesis depends upon how one interprets his claim.
Curley offers his thesis that substance is identical
to "its" attributes as an easy solution to the problem
raised by Leibniz. Curley feels that Leibniz' objection
is valid only if Spinoza holds that substance is not iden-
tical to its attributes. If, however, claims Curley,
Spinoza does believe that substance is identical to its
attributes, there is no real problem. Of course, the
conception of the attributes is necessary for the concep-
tion of substance if they are one and the same thing.
17. Curley, Spinoza's Metaphysics , 18.
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Given substance and its attributes are the same thing,
having to conceive the attributes in order to conceive
substance does not falsify the claim that a substance is
a thing conceived through itself alone. Curley says:
The objection Leibniz makes here is
natural enough, from a Cartesian stand-
point, but the hypothetical reply he is
led to put in Spinoza's mouth is wrong-
headed. It is not that an attribute is
not a thing, but that it is not another
thing .18
So, according to Curley, Leibniz' objection does not hold,
and hence there is no inconsistency.
Curley's thesis does enable Spinoza to avoid the ob-
jection raised by Leibniz. Although positing the identi-
ty of substance and its attributes does solve the Leibniz
problem, it must be asked whether Spinoza can on Curley's
interpretation circumvent De Vries' objection that if there
is more than one attribute there must be more than one
substance .
One might claim that De Vries' objection to Spinoza
is doubly acute if Curley's interpretation of Spinoza is
accurate ( i .e
.
,
that substance is identical to its attri-
butes). For, if there is only one substance, and the at-
tributes of that substance are exactly the same as the sub-
stance, and if as Spinoza claims two distinct attributes
18. Curley, Spinoza's Metaphysics , 16
.
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may be conceived one without the help of the other, how
can it be asserted that this does not constitute two dif-
ferent substances? If substance is identical to its at-
tributes and there are infinitely many distinct attributes,
it would seem there must be infinitely many distinct sub-
stances. This, however, contradicts Spinoza's explicit
statement in proposition XIV that there is only one sub-
stance in the universe
.
One solution to this dilemma for Curley might be for
him to claim that between any two attributes there can on-
ly be a " distinctio rationis " . In otherwords, he could
claim that there can no more be a real plurality of divine
attributes than there can be a real plurality of divine
substances. This is how Wolfson interprets Spinoza. Ac-
cording to Wolfson, the attributes are not really distinct
in substance proper, for they are not really in substance
at all. It is the intellect which perceives the attributes
as distinct, and, it is only in the intellect that the at-
tributes have any kind of existence. Wolfson claims that,
" The .. .attributes appear to the mind as being distinct
19
from each other. In reality, however, they are one."
Wolfson, however, is mistaken. Spinoza did not sim-
ply hold that the attributes appear to be distinct, but
19. Wolfson, Spinoza Vol. I, 156
•
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that they are distinct. This is evident in proposition X
in Part I of the Ethics where he claims, "Each particular
attribute of the one substance must be conceived through
20itself." He also states in the same proposition that
the attributes are in fact conceived as distinct, and
that we can in fact conceive the one without the help of
the other. It is not, therefore, that the attributes
appear to be distinct but that they are and must be dis-
tinct. As Donagan correctly points out, "...Spinoza was
committed to the position that God, the absolutely infi-
• 21
nite substance, has really distinct attributes." Also,
Wolfson is wrong in claiming that although the attributes
are conceived by us as distinct, they are not really so in
substance itself. As seen in Chapter II, what the intel-
lect perceives concerning substance (or anything else for
that matter), it perceives truly. Hence, Curley cannot
avoid De Vries' objection to Spinoza by claiming that be-
tween any two attributes there can only be a " distinctio
rationis "
.
Initially then, it seems, that Curley cannot circum-
vent De Vries' objection by holding that substance, for
Spinoza, is identical to its attributes. If for every
20. Spinoza, Ethics'
, 5 0 •
21. Donagan, "Essence and the Distinction of Attributes,"
in Spinoza
,
M. Grene
,
ed., 173 -
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distinct attribute there corresponds a distinct essence,
and if the essence of substance is one, it seems substance
cannot be identical to its attributes
.
It is at this point that the previous discussion of
the notion of "essence” in Chapter III becomes crucial.
For, if Curley holds that Spinoza's attributes are not
distinct essences, but are each only essential properties
which together constitute the essence of substance, then
Curley's interpretation can avoid De Vries' objection. In
otherwords, if Curley holds what I call interpretation #111,
and therefore claims that the totality of the attributes
constitutes the one and only one essence of substance,
the oneness of substance is preserved. It is preserved be-
cause with this view each attribute is not a distinct es-
sence, but rather a distinct essential property of sub-
stance . Essential properties can be distinct without jeo-
pardizing the unity of substance.
If, however, Curley holds what I have called inter-
pretation #1 or #11, he cannot avoid De Vries' objection.
Both of these interpretations attribute to Spinoza the
view that each attribute is an essence which uniquely in-
dividuates. In both interpretation #1 and #11, "attribute"
or "essence" as it applies to substance uniquely indivi-
duates. If each attribute is an essence then Curley cannot
claim, as he must if he is to avoid De Vries' objection,
that the totality of the attributes constitutes the one
essence of substance
.
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Curley could, therefore, circumvent De Vries' ob-
jection: He could claim that the attributes are essen-
tial properties of substance which together constitute
the one essence of substance
.
Even though Curley can avoid De Vries' objection to
Spinoza, I will show in Chapter VI that Curley's thesis
is mistaken. Substance is not identical to its attributes.
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CHAPTER VI
INTERPRETATIONS OF THE LEIBNIZ AND DE VRIES PROBLEMS
The relationship of Curley's thesis to both the pro-
blem raised by De Vries and the problem raised by Leibniz
has now been presented. As seen in Chapter V, Curley's
interpretation of Spinoza offers a solution to the pro-
blem raised by Leibniz. Also, depending on how one inter-
prets Curley's claim, his interpretation either provides
more support for De Vries' objection, or offers a solu-
tion to it.
For any interpretation to provide a solution to vari-
ous problems, it must first be correct itself. Is Cur-
ley's claim that, for Spinoza, substance is identical to
its attributes correct? I will attempt to show that the
support he offers for his claim fails to establish it,
and that his interpretation is incorrect.
Curley's several reasons for his belief that substance
is identical to its attributes must be examined. Before
examining these, however, it should be mentioned that an
easy way of refuting Curley's position is to hold a "sub-
jective" view of the attributes. The question of v/hether
substance is identical to its attributes is easily an-
swered if one holds, along with Wolfson and others, that
what we perceive as the attributes of substance has no
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reality outside the perceiving intellect. The answer is,
of course, no. If the attributes are "subjective” in
Wolfson's sense they have no real connection with sub-
stance. If the attributes are "subjective", and if sub-
stance is identical to its attributes, then substance is
also "subjective" ( i .e . , substance also has no reality
outside the perceiving intellect). No scholar could attri-
bute this view to Spinoza. It is surprising, therefore,
that Curley neglects the "sub jectivist/ob jectivist" issue
in his treatment of Spinoza. Curley must show why the
"subjectivists" are wrong and the "ob jectivists" are
right to defend his position. He is silent on this issue.
I have shown in Chapter II that there is substantially
more evidence in favor of the "ob jectivist" position. Cur-
ley's thesis cannot be rejected easily by proclaiming the
"subjective" basis of the attributes and the "objective"
basis of substance. His thesis cannot be rejected on
this ground until further evidence can be presented to
support the "subjectivist" claim. If Curley's thesis is
to be rejected, it must be on other grounds. The evidence
he gives to support his claim that substance is identical
to its attributes must be examined.
Initially there seems to be a great deal of evidence
to support Curley's claim. Although the evidence is con-
vincing, I maintain that Curley’s position is mistaken.
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First, he offers three quotations from the Ethics and one
from the Correspondence to support his view. Second, he
attempts to show that the two defining characteristics
of a substance apply also to the attributes. I will show
l) that none of the quotations Curley gives to support
his thesis prove what he thinks they prove, and 2) that
the proof he gives to demonstrate that the properties of
substance are also properties of the attributes is inad-
equate . To prove that the attributes are identical to
substance Curley must show, by the identity of indiscerni-
bles
,
that every property of the attributes is also a
property of substance, and vice versa . This, I contend,
he is unable to do
.
First, the various quotations given by Curley to
support his thesis must be examined. Two of them are
from the Ethics :
God is eternal, or all of his attributes
are eternal.
1
God is immutable
,
or all of his attri-
butes are immutable .2
When first read, these quotations certainly do seem to
provide Curley with support for the view that substance
is identical to its attributes. Spinoza seems to be
1. Curley, Spinoza's Metaphysics
,
17-
2. Ibid.
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equating God with his attributes
. Since God and sub-
stance are identical for Spinoza, it seems as though
substance and its attributes are identical. The reason
these quotations appear to support Curley's claim is be-
cause of the word "or” . Translators other than Curley
have translated these quotations in quite a different
way. The Elwes' translation, for example, renders the
above quotations as follows:
God, and all the attributes of God,
are eternal.
3
God, and all the attributes of God,
are unchangeable.^
The Elwes' translation makes a very different impression
than Curley's. The Elwes' suggests that substance is not
identical to its attributes, either singly or collective-
ly. It suggests that not only God is eternal and immu-
table, but all his attributes are eternal and immutable
also .
If the original Latin is examined, the problem of
literal translation is easily solved. Proposition XIX,
for example, reads as follows: " Deus , sive omnia Dei
attributa sunt aeterna . It is clear that when one
3^ Spinoza, Ethics 7 62. (Underlining mine.)
4. Ibid
. ,
63 . (Underlining mine.)
5 . B. De Spinoza, Opera I , 54.
translates the original Latin literally, the Elwes'
translation is wrong and Curley’s is correct. The word
translated by the one as "or" and the other as "and" is
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the word "sive " . In Latin " sive " is definitely "or".
Curley, therefore, appears to be right in his transla-
tion. It should be mentioned, however, that there is
some justification for a reading of this proposition
using the word "and" and not "or" (that is, for a non-
literal translation)
.
In the demonstration to proposition XX Spinoza says,
zT
" Deus
,
e jusque omnia attri buta sunt aeterna . " This
states that God and all his attributes are eternal. The
Latin word " e jusque " is used, and " e jusque " means "and".
In stating this proposition Spinoza refers back to pro-
position XIX as stating the same thing. The Elwes* trans-
lation, therefore, does appear to have support for the
use of "and" in proposition XIX, instead of "or".
What Spinoza really seems to mean in the above two
quotations cited by Curley is that both God and all his
attributes are eternal. The reason these two quotations
appear to support Curley is because we are reading the "or"
as saying something like "or what is the same thing." It
is not necessary, nor is there any good reason to read the
B. De Sninoza, Opera I , 55 •
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"or” (
”
sive " ) in this way. Spinoza could he saying that
by virtue of the conditional (that for any substance if
all attributes are eternal then it is eternal), the
two disjuncts are the same thing. He could be using the
. "or" of repetition. The "or" could also be read as sig-
nifying an inclusive disjunction. If it signifies an
inclusive disjunction, Spinoza is simply saying that
either God is eternal or all his attributes are eternal,
or both are eternal. The inclusive sense of "or" is a
very plausible reading of proposition XIX.
In summary, there is no reason for reading the "or"
in the above two quotations in a way which gives support
to Curley's thesis. The only support that would give
credibility to Curley's reading of "or" in these state-
ments is if we already accepted the claim that substance
is identical to its attributes.
Other quotations from the Ethics (not given by Cur-
ley), support my interpretation. One example is proposi-
tion XXVIII:
Wherefore it must follow from, or be
conditioned for, existence and action
by God or one of his attributes, in so
far as the latter are modified by some
modification which is finite, and has
a conditioned existence .
7
7. Spinoza, Ethics , 67*
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in this quotation Spinoza dofinitoly separates an attri-
bute from God by signifying something about the latter
(an attrioute ) , which he does not wish to signify by the
former (God). True, only one attribute is mentioned, but
I think that Spinoza would be equally willing to apply
this to all the attributes collectively. What Spinoza
refers to is the fact that the infinite gives rise to the
finite through the attributes, not through substance di-
rectly. He means that the modes follow either from the
attributes of God directly, or from the attributes as
they are modified by the modes—not directly from sub-
stance itself.
The third quotation Curley gives from the Ethics
to support this thesis is:
There is nothing outside the intellect
by which several things can be distin-
guished from one another, except sub-
stances, or what is the same thing,
gtheir attributes, and their affections.
It appears from this quotation that Spinoza identifies
substance with its attributes . Here there is no question
what Spinoza means by "or" . He means "or what is the same
thing." But if one looks closely at this quotation it can
be seen that Spinoza not only says the attributes are the
same thing as substance, but that the affections are also.
The term "affections", for Spinoza, is simply another name
8. Curley, Spinoza's Metaphysics , 16
.
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for' "the term modes Certainly Curley does not want
to claim that Spinoza identifies substance with its
modes . Substance is what is conceived through itself
and what is in itself, whereas the modes are the modifi-
cations of substance, or what exist in and are conceived
through something other than themselves. If Curley is
going to claim that this quotation supports the identi-
fication of substance with its attributes, he is going
to have to show why, then, it does not support the identi-
fication of substance with its modes. Spinoza probably
wants to indicate by this quotation his belief that every-
thing is either an attribute or a mode of the one sub-
stance ( i .e . , "Everything which exists, exists either in
itself or in something else."^).
Curley also gives a quotation from the Correspondence
which he thinks defends his thesis . He feels this quo-
tation shows that Spinoza defines a substance and its
attributes in the same way. He, therefore, concludes they
must be identical. The quotation is:
By attribute I understand whatever is
conceived through itself and in itself,
so that the conception of it does not in-
volve the conception of another thing. 10
While initially this quotation also appears to support
9 . Spinoza, Ethics , 46.
10. Curley, Spinoza's Metaphysics , 17
.
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Curley's thesis, on closer inspection it does not. It
must be recognized that in this quotation Spinoza gives
only a property of an attribute and not a definition of
an attribute . This has already been given in definition
IV, Part I of the Ethics . Further, he only ascribes to
an attribute half of the properties he gives to a sub-
stance in the definition of a substance. He says that
the attributes are conceived through themselves and in
themselves. He does not say that the attributes are in
themselves, but rather, are conceived in themselves. All
Spinoza says is that the attributes share with substance
the fact that they too are conceived through themselves.
This is not a surprising thing for Spinoza to say, since
he states directly in the Ethics that being conceived
through itself is a property of an attribute : "Each
particular attribute of the one substance must be con-
ceived through itself. In otherwords, all Spinoza
asserts is that substance and its attributes share a
common property. If two things share the same property,
it does not follow that they are identical. Curley must
show that substance and its attributes share all their
properties. The above quotation fails to show this.
None of the quotations Curley gives successfully support
his thesis .
11. Spinoza, Ethics , 50.
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Curley, recognizing that to support his thesis he
must show that substance and its attributes have all
their properties in common, attempts to do this. He
tries to show that Spinoza, in giving one half of his
definition of substance in the theorem that every attri-
bute must be conceived through itself, provides us with
the other half. Curley says, since it is the case for
Spinoza that the attributes must be conceived through
themselves, it is not difficult to construct a proof
that what is conceived through itself must be in itself.
The proof Curley gives for this is in reductio form, and
is as follows: (I have written out the premises more
precisely than Curley in order to see his proof better.)
1. X is conceived through itself/
X is in itself
2. X does not exist in itself
3* X exists in something else
4. If X exists in something else,
knowledge of X would depend on
knowledge of that in which it
existed
5 • If knowledge of X depends on
that in which it existed, then
X is not conceived through itself
6. X is not conceived through itself
® 6,1
7 X is in itselr
2
12 . Curley, Spinoza's Metaphysics , 17-18.
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What can be said about this proof? First, it is
obviously valid. However, are the premises such that
Spinoza would have held them all to be true? Spinoza
certainly holds premise 1, as can be seen by his state-
ment that, "Each particular attribute of the one sub-
stance must be conceived through itself." 1 ^ He also
holds premise 3> lor he gives us one of his axioms that,
"Everything .. .exists either in itself or in something
14
else." Since it is given that X does not exist in
itself (premise 2, where X is obviously an attribute),
it must (by the above axiom) exist in something else.
Is premise 4 true? What is Curley's justification for
this premise? He gives as his justification for premise
4 an axiom in the Ethics (#4) which states, "The know-
ledge of an effect depends on and involves the knowledge
pc
of a cause." J In order for axiom #4 to be the justi-
fication for premise 4, however, Curley must feel that
Spinoza would accept the following premise (call it
premise 4
'
)
:
For anything, if it exists in some-
thing else, then it must exist as an
effect of which that something else
is its cause .
13. Spinoza, Ethics , 50*
14
.
Ibid
. ,
46.
15 • Ibid
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In otheiwords, the proof Curley gives must be expanded:
8. If X is in Y, then Y is the cause
of X
9- If Y is the cause of X, then X is
an effect of Y
10. Knowledge of an effect depends on
knowledge of its cause
11. X is in Y
12
. Knowledge of X depends on knowledge
of Y
Would Spinoza hold, as Curley claims he does, that
if X is in Y, then Y is the cause of X ( i .e . , would Spi-
noza hold 4')? If Spinoza would not hold 4', then Cur-
ley's justification for premise 4 in the original proof
fails, and, hence, his entire proof for the proposition
that if X is conceived through itself X is in itself, is
not acceptable .
In order to determine if premise 4' is true for
Spinoza, it is necessary to understand what he means when
he says something is in something else . I have suggested
in Chapter IV that Spinoza means by "in itself" and "in
another" something like that which Aristotle meant when
he said, "Some things can exist apart and some cannot and
l6
it is the former that are substances." In otherwords
l6 . Aristotle, Metaphysics , XII, 5» 1070b, 36-1071a, I,
in Introduction to Aristotle , Richard McKeon, ed.
(New York: Modern Library, 1947), 279.
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substances can exist on their own. Aristotle and Spinoza
seem to be suggesting that there is some kind of dependence
relationship involving attributes and substance (s )
. By
in itself" Spinoza means the following: something
which does not depend on anything else for its existence
or being. By "in another" Spinoza suggests just the
opposite notion: something which depends on something
else for its existence or being. When Spinoza says, for
example, "Whatsoever is, is in God ...," 1 '7 he is saying,
as Parkinson points out, that "...all things depend on
God . . .” 18
Hence, in order for Spinoza to hold that if X is
in Y, then Y is the cause of X, he would have to hold
that all dependence relations are causal. Would Spinoza
hold this? There is no good reason to attribute this
doctrine to him. Actually, Spinoza would probably agree
that there are some dependence relations that are not
causal. Without good reason, one should not attribute
to a thinker a doctrine so obviously false as the one
which would have all dependence relations causal. With-
out doubt something can exist in something else without
17 * Spinoza, Ethics , 55 *
18 . Parkinson, Spinoza's Theory , 17 -
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having that in which it exists as its cause. For exam-
ple, could not Spinoza hold that while X is in Y, Z is
the cause of X, not Y? For Spinoza the mind most defi-
nitely depends on the body (the mind cannot exist without
the body), yet it is God not the body that is the cause
of the mind. Curley has no justification, therefore,
for holding that Spinoza would affirm the truth of pre-
mise 4, which states that if X exists in something else,
knowledge of X would depend on knowledge of that in
which it exists .
It might be argued that although the justification
Curley gives for the truth of premise 4 does not give
its truth, it still is the case that Spinoza would hold
premise 4 true . It might be said that there is other
evidence which would support the view that Spinoza accepts
what premise 4 asserts. For example, in talking about
the modifications of substance Spinoza states, "...modi-
fications exist in something external to themselves, and
a conception of them is formed by means of a conception
of the thing in which they exist." y This sounds like
knowledge of what exists in something else does depend
on knowledge of that something else . I think it is im-
portant to note, however, the word "external", and understand
19. Spinoza, Ethics , 49*
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that Spinoza refers to things which exist in some-
thing external to themselves. Though I think it true
for Spinoza that the attributes do exist in substance,
it is not the case that substance is something external
to its attributes in the way in which it might be said
that the modes are something external to substance . The
sense of "external" I have in mind is that which means
non-essential. The attributes, in this sense, are not
external to substance because they are that which express
its essence . They are the essential properties of sub-
stance (as I have shown earlier). Although the modes
are in substance also, they are outside its essence, and
hence external in the above sense. The modes, as every-
thing else, are in God, but not essential to God. The
attributes, however, belong to the essence of substance,
and as such they are "...that without which the thing
[substance], and which itself without the thing, can
20
neither be nor be conceived." So it appears to be the
case, at least as far as the attributes are concerned,
that if they are in something else (such as substance)
they still can be conceived in themselves. They can and
are conceived through themselves because they are the
essential properties of the thing in which they exist.
20. Spinoza, Ethics , 82.
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Spinoza holds both that the attributes are in substance
and they are conceived through themselves. He states
this when he says, "...it is the nature of substance that
each of its attributes is conceived through itself, inas-
much as all the attributes it has have always existed
21
simultaneously in it ...
"
It is because the attributes
are in substance as its essential properties that they
are conceived through themselves
.
Reasons have been presented to show that the evi-
dence Curley presents to support the thesis that substance
is identical to its attributes fails. In doing this I
have suggested some reasons to believe that Spinoza did
not identify the two . A further reason for believing
that he did not equate substance with "its" attributes
is contained in the following quotation from the Ethics :
. . .to perfect the understanding is
nothing else but to understand God,
God's attributes, and the actions
which follow from the necessity of
his nature .22
Here Spinoza definitely separates God from his attributes.
What we have seen so far, then, is that all of the
evidence Curley presents for his thesis fails. He has
been unable to provide any solid evidence for holding
that substance is identical to "its" attributes. Neither
21. Spinoza, Ethics , 51- (Underlining mine .
)
22. Ibid., 237-
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the quotations he presents, nor the proof he gives, accom-
plish his purpose .
Reconsideration of the Leibniz Problem
As shown previously, Curley offers his thesis that
substance is identical to its attributes as an easy solu-
tion to the problem raised by Leibniz . I have now shown
that Curley's thesis is mistaken. It cannot, therefore,
be used to combat Leibniz' objection to Spinoza. The
question remains: Does Spinoza have an answer to Leibniz?
First, is Leibniz correct in drawing the inference
from, "...an attribute is perceived by the intellect as
constituting the essence of substance," to "...the con-
cept of an attribute is necessary in order to form the
23
concept of substance?" J It might easily be maintained
that one cannot conclude that knowledge of x is necessary
for the conception of y simply from the fact that x con-
stitutes the essence of y . Could not Spinoza claim that
in holding the attributes constitute the essence of sub-
stance, he is not therefore committed to hold that the
attributes must be conceived In order for substance to be
conceived? The answer to this depends on how Spinoza de-
fines "essence".
23^ Leibniz, as quoted in Curley, Spinoza's Metaphysics ,
16 .
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If the definition of "essence" is examined again,
it can be seen that for anything (y) to belong to the
essence of a thing (x), it must be the case that the
thing (x) cannot be conceived without it (y)
.
The attri-
butes, therefore (since they constitute the essence of a
substance), are that without which the substance can
neither be nor be conceived . Leibniz is correct to hold
that, given that the attributes constitute the essence
of the substance, they must be conceived in order for
the substance to be conceived. This being so, he is
correct to challenge Spinoza to show how a substance
can be defined as a thing conceived through itself alone.
How might Spinoza reply to Leibniz? One answer
Spinoza might give is one that is suggested by Leibniz
himself. After criticizing Spinoza for having an incon-
sistency in his definition of "substance" and "attribute",
Leibniz further says,
If you say that an attribute is not a
thing and you really require only that
a substance does not need the concept
of any other thing, I answer that you
must explain what may be called a thing,
so that we may understand the definition
and understand in what way an attribute
is not a thing. 24
24. Leibniz, as quoted in Curley, Spinoza's Metaphysics ,
16 .
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Based on "this quotation of Leibniz
,
it seems that
he is reading Spinoza's definition of "substance" in the
following way: x is a substance = df
. x is in itself and
does not require the conception of any other thing. If
this is the correct reading of Spinoza's definition, then
one possible way for Spinoza to answer Leibniz is as
follows
:
Spinoza could claim that the attributes are not
things, but rather properties of a certain kind of thing,
that is, an independent being called "substance". He
could say all that is required for his definition of
"substance" is that it is in itself and does not need
the conception of any other thing On this interpreta-
tion, Spinoza would be holding that there is only one
kind of thing ( i .e . , substances), and that all the other
objects in the universe are properties of these things
or substances. They are either non-essential properties,
such as the modes, or essential properties, such as the
attributes. Because substances are the only things,
having to conceive the attributes ( i -e . , the essential
properties) of those substances does not conflict with
the claim that a substance is conceived through itself
(if by that it is meant a substance does not require the
conception of any other thing )
.
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There are problems, however, with both Leibniz' in-
terpretation of Spinoza's definition of "substance", and
with the above proposed solution to this interpretation,
ihe above proposed solution to Leibniz
' interpretation
of Spinoza s definition makes that definition either cir-
cular or uninformative. According to the above solution
there is only one kind of thing in the universe ( j , e . ,
substances). A substance is conceived through itself
if it does not require the conception of any other thing.
Neither attributes nor modes qualify as "other things,"
since they are not things but properties
. What is left
to qualify as "another thing" according to the definition
of "substance"? For Spinoza, the only objects in the
universe are either modes, attributes or substances.
("Everything which exists, exists either in itself or in
something else." J ) The only objects left then to quali-
fy as "any other thing" are other substances. If we read
Spinoza’s definition of "substance" filling in "any other
thing" as any other substance, it then seems that Spinoza's
definition is circular ( i . e
.
,
x is a substance = df . x is
in itself and does not require the conception of any other
substance). If his definition is not exactly circular,
25- Spinoza, Ethics
,
46.
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it is at the very least uninformative since we can still
ask what a substance is
.
Perhaps a more fruitful way for Spinoza to answer
Leibniz is to claim that Leibniz is misreading his defi-
nition of "substance". Instead of reading his definition
of "substance" as x is a substance = df
. x is in itself
and does not require the conception of any other thing,
it is more properly read as follows: x is a substance =
df . x is in itself and for any y where y / x, the con-
ception of x does not involve the conception of y. This
reading of Spinoza's definition does not seem to lead to
circularity, nor does it appear to be uninformative. In
this reading of Spinoza one construes "any other thing"
as "any other y," where y is a variable which can range
over any number of objects . The problem with this defi-
nition is that if the variable "y" is allowed to range
over the attributes of a substance, then it seems Leibniz
is correct in stating that Spinoza's definition of "sub-
stance" is inconsistent with his definition of "attribute".
A substance cannot be conceived without its attributes.
Spinoza could claim that the variable "y" does not
range over the attributes of a substance. Consequently,
he would mean that a substance with its attributes is
what is conceived through itself without the conception
of any other y. The definition of "substance" would then
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read: x is a substance = df
. x is in itself and for any
y where y / x and y is not an attribute of x, the concep-
tion of x does not involve the conception of y . On this
interpretation "any other y" could be any number of things:
the attributes of other substances, modes, etc. Spinoza
could claim that it is only when one construes "any other
y" as ranging over the attributes of the substance that
there is an inconsistency between his definition of "sub-
stance" and his definition of "attribute".
Unfortunately this revised definition of "substance"
also has problems. The revised definition of "substance"
makes use of the term "attribute". Spinoza defines "at-
tribute" as that which constitutes "...the essence of
substance . " The two definitions together are circular.
This investigation shows that all attempts to avoid
the inconsistency between Spinoza's definition of "sub-
stance" and his definition of "attribute" (excluding Cur-
ley's) involve him in circularity. Hence, it appears that
Spinoza does not have an answer to the Leibniz problem.
Spinoza, Ethics , 45. (Underlining mine.)
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Solution to De Vries Problem
As mentioned earlier, Curley's interpretation can
avoid De Vries' objection if Curley holds interpretation
explicated in Chapter III
. Even though he could
hold interpretation ifIII, and thereby avoid De Vries'
objection to Spinoza, it is shown in Chapter VI that
Curley's thesis is mistaken— substance is not identical
to its attributes. Any interpretation of Spinoza which
is to avoid De Vries' objection must hold something simi-
lar to interpretation #111 . It must be held that for
Spinoza the attributes are singly essential properties,
which together constitute the one essence of substance.
It cannot be maintained that each attribute is an "es-
sence" without jeopardizing the unity and simplicity of
substance .
Given the attributes are simply essential properties,
it seems Spinoza would have little difficulty meeting De
Vries' objection. Why understand Spinoza as having
identified the essence of substance with each of its
defining attributes? As soon as we uncover and reject
the buried premise in De Vries' objection (that to every
distinct attribute there corresponds a really distinct
essence), the problem is dissolved. Why should the mul-
tiplicity of the attributes jeopardize the oneness of
128
substance? Cannot a single substance have many properties
v/ithout itself being many? As long as Spinoza does not
hold that each attribute is an essence (in Plantinga's
sense), I cannot see that he has any real problem meet-
ing De Vries’ objection. The weight of the issue is on
De Vries to show that it cannot be the case that one
2 7substance has many essential properties.
In summary, a critique of Curley’s thesis has been
given, and an interpretation of Spinoza offered which
provides a possible solution to the De Vries' problem.
It has also been shown that Spinoza cannot avoid the
Leibniz problem.
27- A. Donagan comes to this conclusion in his article,
"Essence and the Distinction of Attributes," in
Spinoza
,
M. Grene
,
ed., 164-181.
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CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSIONS
In the beginning of Chapter I, I argue that in
order to understand proposition XIV (Spinoza's statement
of the claim that there is exactly one substance), it is
necessary to understand the argument Spinoza employs in
support of this claim. It is pointed out that Spinoza's
argument in support of proposition XIV has three sepa-
rate parts, none of which independently supports propo-
sition XIV. Spinoza argues: (1) There is at least one
substance; (2) one substance cannot produce or cause
another substance; and (3) there cannot be two self-caused
substances. I then present Spinoza's arguments for claims
(2) and (3)- In the remainder of Chapter I, I examine
some of the premises in the arguments for the claim that
there is only one substance, and show that without an un-
derstanding of certain key concepts ("attribute", "essence",
and "substance") embedded in the premises of the arguments,
the premises are unintelligible
.
In Chapter II through VI an analysis of the concepts
of "substance", "attribute" and "essence" is presented.
The meaning of these concepts in the context of Spinoza's
system is shown.
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As previously seen, the discussion of "attribute"
and essence cannot be separated* The term "essence"
is employed in two senses. These senses are shown through,
1) an examination of the definition of "essence", and 2)
Spinoza's use of the term in various contexts. The term
"essence" can mean either an essential property, or some-
thing which (in Plantinga's sense) "uniquely individuates."
Since Spinoza defines "attribute" as that which consti-
tutes the essence of a substance, "attribute" also is
used in these two senses. Whenever "attribute" signifies
an individual attribute, it means an essential property.
Whenever "attribute" signifies the collection of all the
individual attributes or essential properties, it (the
collection) uniquely individuates whatever has it. In
otherwords, it (the collection) is something that can-
not be shared by two or more distinct individuals.
Apart from these two senses, it is discovered that
our ideas of the attributes represent true characteriza-
tions of substance, and are not simply mental constructs
which are incapable of revealing any true information
about a substance.
A substance, for Spinoza, is a thing which is inde-
pendent of any other thing and is conceived without the
help of the conception of any other thing. When "any
other thing" is filled out it is discovered that it must
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mean any other substance, and hence he has a circular
definition. When Spinoza defines a substance as that
v/hich is conceived through itself alone, he is correctly
challenged by Leibniz to show how this is possible given
that it is necessary to conceive the attributes in order
to conceive the substance.
With the above information now at hand, a better
and clearer examination of Spinoza’s arguments for pro-
position XIV is possible
.
Argument A is one of Spinoza's arguments for the
claim that one substance cannot be produced by another
substance. Premises 2, 4 and 6 are crucial in this ar-
gument . A reconsideration of these in light of the bet-
ter understanding of Spinoza's central concepts clarifies
some issues which were previously problematic . Other
issues remain unresolved.
Argument A. Premise 4. (proposition II,
Ethics )
Two substances whose attributes are dif-
ferent have nothing in common.
1
In the proof for this premise, Spinoza restates his
definition of a substance (definition iii, Ethics I),
and claims that Premise 4 (proposition II ) follows from
this definition alone. It is still unclear how Premise 4
1. Spinoza, Ethics , 46.
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follows from definition iii without the inclusion of some
suppressed premise. My conclusion is that Premise 4 is
nothing but a restatement of definition iii, and the
search for a suppressed premise is the wrong direction
to take . A more fruitful way to understand Premise 4
than searching for a suppressed premise, is to seek an
understanding of what Spinoza means when he says two
things have nothing in common.
When Spinoza says this he means the conception of
the one does not involve the conception of the other.
Premise 4 when filled out in this way states that, when
two substances have different attributes the conception
of one does not involve the conception of the other.
Since this is precisely how Spinoza defines a substance
( i .e
.
,
a substance is conceived through itself alone),
the phrase "whose attributes are different" appears to
be parenthetical. It appears to be added because the
attributes, like a substance, are conceived without the
conception of anything else . The meaning of this phrase
is now clear. To say that two substances have different
attributes means that the collection of the attributes of
each substance uniquely individuates it. Filled out in
this way Premise 4 reads, if two substances are uniquely
individuated then the conception of one does not involve
the conception of the other. Yet, even with this new
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understanding the phrase "whose attributes are different"
is still parenthetical. It is still true that two sub-
stances by definition have nothing in common, if by that
is meant the conception of the one does not involve the
conception of the other.
Since Premise 4 is simply a restatement of part of
Spinoza's definition of a substance, it is subject to
the difficulties of that definition. One cannot define
a substance, without circularity, as that which does not
involve the conception of any other substance. The Leib-
niz objection, and the problem of circularity in the
definition persist.
Argument A. Premise 2. (proposition III,
Ethics )
Things which have nothing in common can-
not the one be the cause of the other. 2
Spinoza's proof for this premise is layed out in
Argument D of Chapter I . In addition to the information
already understood regarding what it means to say two
things have nothing in common ( i . e . , the conception of the
one does not involve the conception of the other), there
is the further understanding that this signifies neither
modes nor attributes are shared by these two things.
2. Spinoza, Ethics
,
4?
•
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Even with a better understanding of Spinoza's key
concepts, Premise 2 is unclear for the following reasons:
1) the referent of "things” is left unspecified; and 2)
the acceptability and interpretation of Axiom IY in
Argument D (Spinoza's proof for Premise 2), is still in
question
.
Premise 2 (proposition III) does not specify that
the "things” in question are substances. As stated pre-
viously, it is possible that the things are modes. Modes
are that which are conceived through something other
than themselves. Understanding "things" to be modes,
and understanding "having nothing in common" to mean the
conception of the one does not involve the conception of
the other, the premise reads: Two things which are con-
ceived through something other than themselves (modes),
where the conception of the one does not involve the
conception of the other cannot the one cause the other.
Filling out Premise 2 in this way seems completely im-
plausible . There is nothing in the antecedent that pre-
cludes the one mode causing the other mode.
Understanding "things" here to mean substances, the
premise reads: Two things which are conceived through
themselves where the conception of the one does not in-
volve the conception of the other cannot the one cause
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the other. This says that because a substance by defini-
tion is conceived through itself it cannot cause another
substance . The reason Spinoza thinks this is the case
is contained in Axioms IV and V of the Ethics Axiom V
says that if two substances are self-conceived then the
one cannot be understood by means of the other. This
seems true given that the conception of the one does not
involve the conception of the other. In Axiom IV Spinoza
claims that if substance A causes substance B f then the
knowledge of B depends on and involves the knowledge of
A. But, by virtue of Spinoza's definition of a substance
and Axiom V, knowledge of B cannot depend on and involve
knowledge of A . If we grant the truth of Axiom IV
(knowledge of an effect depends on knowledge of its
cause) and accept Spinoza's definition of a substance,
then one substance cannot cause another substance . The
problems with Spinoza's definition of a substance have
already been given. The interpretation of Axiom IV, and
its acceptability, is still a matter of question. If we
understand Spinoza to claim that we cannot in any sense
know the effect of some cause without knowing the cause,
then his claim is false. If his claim is rather that we
cannot have full knowledge of an effect without knowing
3 . Spinoza, Ethics , 46.
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its cause, then he must tell us what is meant by full
knowledge of the effect, and show how a criterion as
strict as this does not prevent us from ever knowing
anything. Premise 2, therefore, depending as it does
on the claim that knowledge of an effect depends on
and involves knowledge of its cause, seems unacceptable.
Argument A. Premise 6. (proposition V,
Ethics )
There cannot exist in the universe two
or more substances having the same na-
ture or attribute
.
This premise can now be examined in light of the
discussion of "attribute" and "essence" in Chapters II
and III. The evaluation of Premise 6 is now possible.
The only problem with this premise is the proof Spinoza
gives for it. His proof does not show that two substances
cannot have the same nature or attribute
,
but rather is
a proof for the conclusion that there is only one sub-
stance . In this proof he claims that this premise is
so obvious it needs no further illumination ("...it will
be granted that there cannot be more than one with an
identical attribute."^). Its obviousness is now evident.
Spinoza is not claiming that two or more substances
cannot share the same essential property, that is, he is
43 Spinoza, Ethics
,
47
•
5 • Ibid
.
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not claiming that they cannot have an attribute in com-
mon. He is claiming that two or more substances cannot
share all their attributes ( i .e . , their essences), and be
distinct. The collection of the attributes of a substance
(its essence) is that which uniquely individuates that
substance from any other thing. With the understanding
of "same nature or attribute" as that which uniquely in-
dividuates whatever has it, it is obviously true by
Leibniz' Law that no two substances (or no two things
for that matter) can share all their properties and be
distinct
.
Argument B is a second argument Spinoza puts forth
in support of the conclusion that one substance cannot
be produced by another substance . Premises 2 and 4 are
the most significant. Both have been encountered and dis-
cussed in connection with Argument A.
Argument B. Premise 2. (Axiom IV,
Ethics )
The knowledge of an effect depends on
and involves the knowledge of a cause .°
This premise appeared in Argument D, in support of
Premise 2 of Argument A. It is subject to the same
difficulties mentioned there. The claim is either false
or has such a strict application that knowledge of any-
thing seems impossible
.
Spinoza, Ethics , 46 .
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Argument B. Premise 4. (definition
iii
,
Ethics )
Substance is that which is in itself
and conceived through itself; in other
words, that of which a conception can
be formed independently of any other
conception .
7
This is Spinoza's definition of substance, and is
carefully examined in Chapter IV. The first part of
the definition refers to the idea that a substance is
capable of independent existence. (It needs no other
thing in order to exist.) Two problems persist with
this: 1) It seems that a substance cannot exist without
its attributes, making independent existence questiona-
ble; and 2) the definition is circular, since when it is
asked what a substance with its attributes is independent
of, the answer is another substance with its attributes.
The second part of Spinoza's definition (conceived
through itself) is subject to the problem raised by
Leibniz
. In order to conceive substance it is necessary
to conceive the attributes of substance, and hence the
claim (that a substance is conceived through itself
alone) is false.
Arguments A and B in support of the conclusion that
one substance cannot produce or cause another substance
7. Spinoza, Ethics , 45-
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fail "to support that conclusion. It has heen found that
the crucial premises in "both arguments are problematic.
Argument C is Spinoza's main argument for the con-
clusion that there cannot he two self-caused substances
.
Premises 2, 4 and 6 are crucial in this argument. In
Premise 2 Spinoza says that every substance is necessarily
infinite
. In Premise 4 he asserts that anything which has
infinite reality must have infinite attributes. In Pre-
mise 6 he claims that the possession of infinite attri-
butes entails the possession of all possible attributes.
All of these premises are closely related. A discussion
of any one of these premises leads to a discussion of the
other two. The important questions raised by these pre-
mises are the following: In what sense does Spinoza use
the term "infinite"? Is his notion of infinity a plausi-
ble one?
Consider Spinoza's use of the term "infinite" in
Premise 2 (proposition VIII) of Argument C: "Every sub-
g
stance is necessarily infinite." The proof for this pre-
mise is :
There can only be one substance with
an identical attribute, and existence
follows from its nature (prop, vii
. )
;
its nature, therefore, involves
existence, either as finite or
8. Spinoza, Ethics
,
48.
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infinite . It does not exist as fi-
nite
,
for (by def. ii
. ) it would
then be limited by something else
of the same kind which would also
necessarily exist (prop, vii.);
and there would be two substances
with an identical attribute, which
is absurd (prop. v.). It therefore
exists as infinite .9
On the basis of this proof, it seems that for Spinoza a
substance is infinite if it is unlimited, that is, if it
is not limited by something else of the same kind. There-
fore, a substance or God is infinite if it is not limited
by another substance or God. In the above proof Spinoza
speaks of the finite as something limited, and tells us
that in the case of substance this is "absurd"--a sub-
stance cannot be limited by something else of the same
kind. This is precisely how G. Parkinson interprets
Spinoza's use of the term "infinite" in Premise 2 (propo-
sition VIII). Parkinson states that, "The first argument
...which says that every substance is necessarily infinite,
is actually to show that every substance is what Spinoza
calls 'infinite in its own kind'."
10 Although the proof
to Premise 2 does provide a strong reason for believing
with Parkinson that Spinoza has the meaning of "infinite
9-
10 .
Spinoza, Ethics , 48.
Parkinson, Theory of Knowledge , 58-59 •
in i ub kind. ( i - 6 , unlimited) in mind in "this premise,
there are stronger reasons for another interpretation.
If one returns to Spinoza's definition of God
(definition vi ) , it can be seen that he has two different
senses of the term "infinite"
.
By God, I mean a being absolutely
infinite--that is, a substance con-
sisting in infinite attributes, of
which each expresses eternal and
infinite essentiality. I say ab-
solutely infinite, not infinite
after its kind: for, of a thing
infinite only after its kind, in-
finite attributes may be denied;
but that which is absolutely infi-
nite
,
contains in its essence what-
ever expresses reality...
H
There is for Spinoza the absolutely infinite or God (sense
1), and the contrasted infinite in its kind (sense 2).
Spinoza defines a thing that is absolutely infinite as a
thing which has an infinite number of attributes, that is,
a being which possesses all possible reality.
A thing which is infinite in its own kind is a thing
of which "infinite attributes may be denied" . Spinoza has
no further explanation for what it is to be infinite in its
own kind. He does, however, say what it means for a thing
to be finite after its kind and it seems reasonable to ex-
pect that infinite after its kind signifies just the opposite.
11. Spinoza, Ethics , 45-46.
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Something is finite after its kind when it "...can be
limited by another thing of the same nature."'12 Some-
thing, then, would be infinite after its own kind when
it cannot be limited by another thing of the same nature
.
Hence, infinite in its own kind seems to mean unlimited.
It is my view that Spinoza means by infinite in
Premise 2, the absolutely infinite (sense 1), not as
Parkinson suggests, the infinite in its own kind (sense
2). I hold this view for the following reasons:
To begin, I agree with Wolfson that propositions
VIII and IX must be seen together as premises for the
conclusion that substance possesses an infinite number of
13
attributes. Spinoza's argument is: Every substance is
necessarily infinite ( i .e
.
,
possesses infinite reality or
being). The more reality or being a thing has, the greater
the number of its attributes (proposition IX). Therefore,
substance possesses infinite attributes . There are sever-
al reasons why I feel this particular interpretation of
Wolfson' s is correct. Spinoza's order of presentation in-
dicates that proposition VIII should not be viewed as an
isolated proposition. The argument is very neatly presented
in order in propositions VIII, IX and X. In proposition VIII
12 . Spinoza, Ethics , 45-
13. Wolfson, Spinoza Vol. I, 139*
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Spinoza says that every substance is necessarily
infinite. In proposition IX he says that the more
reality a thing has the more attributes it possesses.
And at the end of the note to proposition X Spinoza as-
serts that, "Consequently it is abundantly clear, that an
absolutely infinite being must necessarily be defined as
14
consisting m infinite attributes..." If one sees the
relationship between these three premises, one must ar-
rive at the conclusion that "infinite" in Premise 2 means
absolutely infinite, not infinite in its kind.
Second, there is no reason to suppose that when
Spinoza speaks of things that are infinite in their kind
he is referring to substances. More likely, he has in
mind things like attributes, which are also infinite (not
absolutely, but rather in their own kind). When referring
to substances, clearly the infinity Spinoza has in mind
is that of the absolutely infinite. Support for this
interpretation is Spinoza's use of the terms "God" and
"substance" interchangeably. For Spinoza, whatever is
true of God is true of substance. God, as we have seen,
is defined as the absolutely infinite, not the infinite
in its kind. Therefore, substance must also be the abso-
lutely infinite
.
l4 . Spinoza. Ethics , 51
•
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Third, Argument C, Spinoza's principal argument to
show that there cannot be two self-caused substances, does
not make sense when "infinite” in Premise 2 is read as in-
finite in its own kind. The argument depends upon our
understanding "infinite" to mean absolutely infinite.
Spinoza's argument in C is that there cannot be two sub-
stances, because if there were they would have to share
the same attribute . They must share the same attribute
because a substance is infinite, that is, it possesses
all possible attributes. A substance has every possible
attribute
,
and hence if there were two substances their
attributes would have to overlap. If one reads Premise
2 as "infinite in its kind," Spinoza has no argument for
the conclusion that there cannot be two infinite substances.
In Spinoza's system it is possible to have two infinite
substances, if by infinite one means infinite after their
own kind. Parkinson is wrong to read Premise 2 as an ar-
gument designed to show that every substance is "infinite
after its own kind."
With this understanding of Premise 2, Premise 4 is
easily understood. Premise 4 is simply a restatement of
Spinoza's view that an infinite substance is one which
has an infinite number of attributes. What is said in
Premise 4 (proposition IX) has already been given in
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Spinoza's definition of God. Premise 6 fills out what
Spinoza means by an infinite number of attributes: He
means an exhaustive number of attributes
. For Spinoza
there can only be one infinity of attributes— that pos-
sessed by the one substance, God. Substance must contain
in its essence whatever expresses reality. This precludes
there being more than one substance
.
One thing seems clear--Spinoza has a false notion
of infinity. He cannot conceive of two infinite things,
each with an infinite number of members, yet neither
having any members in common with each other. If two
things have an infinite number of members, then, for
Spinoza, their members must be the same. One counter-
example to Spinoza is as follows: There is an infinite
number of integers from 2 to infinity. There is also an
infinite number of real numbers between 0 and 1. Both
of these sets have an infinite number of members, yet
no member of the one set is a member of the other. Spino-
za holds that only those things are infinite which are in-
capable of further increase , or to which nothing can be
adjoined or added. Modern construals of infinity lay
emphasis on the perpetual capability of increase . Those
things are infinite which are always capable of further
increase. As Bolzano points out, Spinoza's definition of
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infinity is too narrow. Bolzano states:
One can add quantities to any quantity
whatsoever even to one infinitely great
. . .and those added quantities can al-
ready he themselves infinite ....
What mathematician is there who, if
he allows infinity of any kind, is
not forced to concede that the length
of a straight line hounded on one side
but stretching to infinity on the other
is infinitely great and nevertheless
capable of being increased on the side
hitherto limited. 15
Therefore, Argument C (Spinoza's argument for the conclu-
sion that there cannot be two self-caused infinite sub-
stances), is unacceptable due to his false notion of
infinity
.
Closing Remarks
By careful examination it has been found that most
of Spinoza's arguments for the claim that there is only
one substance in the university are either problematic or
defective. The main obstacle to Spinoza's claim is not
what is commonly thought, that is, the De Vries problem,
but rather the arguments themselves. All the arguments
examined have been found to include very problematic
premises. Spinoza is unable to satisfactorily prove
either that, l) one substance cannot be produced by another
15. B. Bolzano, Paradoxes of the Infinite (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 195°) » 82.
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suostance, or 2) that there cannot be two self-caused in-
finite substances- .since both of these claims are neces —
sary to establish proposition XIV, he is unable to support
this proposition. Although Spinoza's arguments for the
thesis that there is only one substance are not as ob-
vious as the emperor's new clothes, they are equally
inadequate .
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